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DATA NATIONALISM 
Anupam Chander∗ 
Uyên P. Lê∗∗ 
ABSTRACT 
A BRICS Internet, the Euro Cloud, the Iranian “Halal” Internet: 
Governments across the world eager to increase control over the World Wide 
Web are tearing it apart. Iran seeks to develop an Internet free of Western 
influences or domestic dissent. The Australian government places restrictions 
on health data leaving the country. Russia requires personal information to be 
stored domestically. Vietnam insists on a local copy of all Vietnamese data. 
The last century’s nontariff barriers to goods have reappeared as firewalls 
blocking international services. Legitimate global anxieties over surveillance 
and security are justifying governmental measures that break apart the World 
Wide Web, without enhancing either privacy or security. 
The issue is critical to the future of international trade and development, 
and even to the ongoing struggle between democracy and totalitarianism. Data 
localization threatens the possibility of outsourcing services, whether to 
Bangalore, Accra, Manila, or even Silicon Valley. The theory of this Article 
expands the conversation about international Internet regulation from efforts 
to prevent data from flowing in to a country through censorship, to include 
efforts to prevent data from flowing out through data localization. A simple 
formula helps demonstrate what is stake: censorship + data localization = 
total control. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The era of a global Internet may be passing. Governments across the world 
are putting up barriers to the free flow of information across borders. Driven 
by concerns over privacy, security, surveillance, and law enforcement, 
governments are erecting borders in cyberspace, breaking apart the World 
Wide Web. The first generation of Internet border controls sought to keep 
information out of a country—from Nazi paraphernalia to copyright infringing 
material.1 The new generation of Internet border controls seeks not to keep 
information out but rather to keep data in. Where the first generation was 
relatively narrow in the information excluded, the new generation seeks to 
keep all data about individuals within a country. 
Efforts to keep data within national borders have gained traction in the 
wake of revelations of widespread electronic spying by United States 
intelligence agencies.2 Governments across the world, indignant at the recent 
disclosures, have cited foreign surveillance as an argument to prevent data 
from leaving their borders, allegedly into foreign hands.3 As the argument 
 
 1 See Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, May 22, 2000, 
D. 2000 inf. rap. 172, obs. J. Gomez, available at http://juriscom.net/2000/05/tgi-paris-refere-22-mai-2000-
uejf-et-licra-c-yahoo-inc-et-yahoo-france/, translation available at http://www.lapres.net/yahen.html (Daniel 
Arthur Laprès, trans.); Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, Nov. 
20, 2000, JCP 2000, Actu., 2219, obs. J. Gomez (Fr.), available at http://juriscom.net/wp-content/documents/ 
tgiparis20001120.pdf, translation available at http://www.lapres.net/yahen11.html (Daniel Arthur Laprès, 
trans.); see also Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Cotnre le Racisme et L’Antisemtisime, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(en banc) (per curiam) (discussing the French proceedings and parallel proceedings in the United States). For a 
domestic example, see Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011), which was ostensibly designed 
to require internet service providers to block access to foreign websites hosting copyright infringing materials. 
 2 The disclosures based on Edward Snowden’s documents began with the following article: Glenn 
Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013, 
06.05 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order. Earlier 
accounts of the NSA’s global surveillance plans include James Bamford, The Black Box, WIRED, Apr. 2012, at 
78, available at http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2012/05/features/the-black-box. Such intelligence 
gathering is hardly limited to the United States, of course. David E. Sanger, David Barboza & Nicole Perlroth, 
China’s Army Seen as Tied to Hacking Against U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2013, at A1, available at http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/technology/chinas-army-is-seen-as-tied-to-hacking-against-us.html (describing 
hacking of United States computer networks, apparently from China); see also Ewen MacAskill et al., GCHQ 
Taps Fibre-optic Cables for Secret Access to World’s Communications, GUARDIAN (June 21, 2013, 12:23 
EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-nsa (describing 
United Kingdom surveillance of global communications). 
 3 See Bundesregierung, Merkel: Neue Projekte mit Frankreich [Merkel: New Projects with France], 
YOUTUBE (Feb. 15, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MQo1mcyDvUg (showing German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel’s discussion of European data protection); Max Smolaks, Russian Government Will Force 
Companies to Store Citizen Data Locally, TECHWEEK EUR. (July 4, 2014, 17:22), http://www.techweekeurope. 
co.uk/news/russian-government-will-force-companies-store-citizen-data-locally-148560 (noting that Russia’s 
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goes, placing data in other nations jeopardizes the security and privacy of such 
information. We define “data localization” measures as those that specifically 
encumber the transfer of data across national borders. These measures take a 
wide variety of forms—including rules preventing information from being sent 
outside the country, rules requiring prior consent of the data subject before 
information is transmitted across national borders, rules requiring copies of 
information to be stored domestically, and even a tax on the export of data. We 
argue here that data localization will backfire and that it in fact undermines 
privacy and security, while still leaving data vulnerable to foreign surveillance. 
Even more importantly, data localization increases the ability of governments 
to surveil and even oppress their own populations. 
Imagine an Internet where data must stop at national borders, examined to 
see whether it is allowed to leave the country and possibly taxed when it does. 
While this may sound fanciful, this is precisely the impact of various measures 
undertaken or planned by many nations to curtail the flow of data outside their 
borders. Countries around the world are in the process of creating Checkpoint 
Charlies—not just for highly secret national security data but for ordinary data 
about citizens. The very nature of the World Wide Web is at stake. We will 
show how countries across the world have implemented or have planned 
dramatic steps to curtail the flow of information outside their borders. By 
creating national barriers to data, data localization measures break up the 
World Wide Web, which was designed to share information across the globe.4 
The Internet is a global network based on a protocol for interconnecting 
computers without regard for national borders. Information is routed across 
this network through decisions made autonomously and automatically at local 
routers, which choose paths based largely on efficiency, unaware of political 
borders.5 Thus, the services built on the Internet, from email to the World 
 
“legal measure is widely seen as a response to reports about the intrusive surveillance practices of the US 
National Security Agency (NSA) and the UK’s GCHQ”); Thomas K. Thomas, Route Domestic Net Traffic via 
India Servers, NSA Tells Operators, HINDU BUS. LINE (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/ 
industry-and-economy/info-tech/route-domestic-net-traffic-via-india-servers-nsa-tells-operators/article5022 
791.ece (stating that India’s Deputy National Security Advisor has reportedly sought “ways to route domestic 
Internet traffic via servers within the country,” and quoting an official who said that “[s]uch an arrangement 
would limit the capacity of foreign elements to scrutinise intra-India traffic”). 
 4 See TIM BERNERS-LEE WITH MARK FISCHETTI, WEAVING THE WEB: THE ORIGINAL DESIGN AND 
ULTIMATE DESTINY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB BY ITS INVENTOR 4 (1999) (describing a vision of a “single, 
global information space”). 
 5 For a brief overview of the architecture of the Internet, see ETHAN ZUCKERMAN & ANDREW 
MCLAUGHLIN, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INSTITUTIONS (2003), available at http:// 
cyber.law.harvard.edu/digitaldemocracy/internetarchitecture.pdf. 
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Wide Web, pay little heed to national borders. Services such as cloud 
computing exemplify this, making the physical locations for the storage and 
processing of their data largely invisible to users. Data localization would 
dramatically alter this fundamental architecture of the Internet. 
Such a change poses a mortal threat to the new kind of international trade 
made possible by the Internet—information services such as those supplied by 
Bangalore or Silicon Valley.6 Barriers of distance or immigration restrictions 
had long kept such services confined within national borders. But the new 
services of the Electronic Silk Road often depend on processing information 
about the user, information that crosses borders from the user’s country to the 
service provider’s country. Data localization would thus require the 
information service provider to build out a physical, local infrastructure in 
every jurisdiction in which it operates, increasing costs and other burdens 
enormously for both providers and consumers and rendering many of such 
global services impossible. 
While others have observed some of the hazards of data localization, 
especially for American companies,7 this Article offers three major advances 
over earlier work in the area. First, while the earlier analyses have referred to a 
data localization measure in a country in the most general of terms, our Article 
provides a detailed legal description of localization measures. Second, by 
examining a variety of key countries around the world, the study allows us to 
see the forms in which data localization is emerging and the justifications 
offered for such measures in both liberal and illiberal states. Third, the Article 
works to comprehensively refute the various arguments for data localization 
offered around the world, showing that data localization measures are in fact 
likely to undermine security, privacy, economic development, and innovation 
where adopted. 
 
 6 See ANUPAM CHANDER, THE ELECTRONIC SILK ROAD 2–3 (2013). 
 7 See, e.g., BUS. ROUNDTABLE, PROMOTING ECONOMIC GROWTH THROUGH SMART GLOBAL 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY POLICY: THE GROWING THREAT OF LOCAL DATA SERVER REQUIREMENTS (2012), 
available at http://businessroundtable.org/sites/default/files/legacy/uploads/studies-reports/downloads/Global_ 
IT_Policy_Paper_final.pdf; DANIEL CASTRO, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., HOW MUCH WILL PRISM 
COST THE U.S. CLOUD COMPUTING INDUSTRY? (2013), available at http://www2.itif.org/2013-cloud-
computing-costs.pdf; STEPHEN J. EZELL, ROBERT D. ATKINSON & MICHELLE A. WEIN, INFO. TECH. & 
INNOVATION FOUND., LOCALIZATION BARRIERS TO TRADE: THREAT TO THE GLOBAL INNOVATION ECONOMY 
(2013), available at http://www2.itif.org/2013-localization-barriers-to-trade.pdf; EDWARD GRESSER, 
PROGRESSIVE ECON., 21ST-CENTURY TRADE POLICY: THE INTERNET AND THE NEXT GENERATION’S GLOBAL 
ECONOMY (2014), available at http://progressive-economy.org/files/2014/01/21st.Century.Trade_.pdf; U.S. 
INT’L TRADE COMM’N, PUB. 4415, DIGITAL TRADE IN THE U.S. AND GLOBAL ECONOMIES, PART 1 (2013), 
available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4415.pdf. 
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Our paper proceeds as follows. Part I describes the particular data 
localization measures in place or proposed in different countries around the 
world, as well as in the European Union. Part II then discusses the 
justifications commonly offered for these measures—such as avoiding foreign 
surveillance, enhancing security and privacy, promoting economic 
development, and facilitating domestic law enforcement. We appraise these 
arguments, concluding that, in fact, such measures are likely to backfire on all 
fronts. Data localization will erode privacy and security without rendering 
information free of foreign surveillance, while at the same time increasing the 
risks of domestic surveillance. 
I. COUNTRY STUDIES 
We review here data localization measures in seventeen states—Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, 
Malaysia, Nigeria, Russia, South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, and 
Vietnam—as well as the European Union and a handful of other countries in 
less detail. The problem of data localization is even more pervasive than the 
jurisdictions we identify. Furthermore, the measures achieve data localization 
in a wide variety of ways. While some of the measures explicitly force data to 
be located on home country servers, often the localizing effect is less visible 
and more indirect. Kazakhstan’s directive, for example, is explicit, requiring 
new companies using the “.kz” top level domain to operate from physical 
servers located within the country.8 Malaysia, on the other hand, requires 
consent for international transfer of data, which can prove a significant hurdle.9 
Taiwan permits authorities to restrict transfers if they concern “major national 
interests.”10 Other regulations focus on selected sectors. Australia prevents 
health records from being transferred outside the country if they are personally 
identifiable.11 In sum, our study reveals the astonishing array of countries that 
have enacted or are considering data localization. 
 
 8 FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM ON THE NET 2013: A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT OF INTERNET AND DIGITAL 
MEDIA 441 (Sanja Kelly et al. eds., 2013), available at http://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/resources/ 
FOTN%202013_Full%20Report_0.pdf. 
 9 Personal Data Protection Act 2010 § 129 (Act No. 709) (Malay.), available at http://www.kkmm.gov. 
my/pdf/Personal%20Data%20Protection%20Act%202010.pdf. 
 10 Personal Information Protection Act (promulgated by the Ministry of Justice, May 26, 2010), art. 21 
(Taiwan), available at http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=I0050021. 
 11 Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 2012 (Cth) s 77 (Austl.). 
CHANDER_LE GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/19/2015 12:30 PM 
2015] DATA NATIONALISM 683 
A. Australia 
In 2012, Australia passed the Personally Controlled Electronic Health 
Records (PCEHR) Act, Section 77 of which prohibits the transfer of health 
records outside of Australia, with certain exceptions.12 Subsection 1 provides: 
The System Operator, a registered repository operator, a 
registered portal operator or a registered contracted service provider 
that holds records for the purposes of the PCEHR system (whether or 
not the records are also held for other purposes) or has access to 
information relating to such records, must not: (a) hold the records, or 
take the records, outside Australia; or (b) process or handle the 
information relating to the records outside Australia; or (c) cause or 
permit another person: (i) to hold the records, or take the records, 
outside Australia; or (ii) to process or handle the information relating 
to the records outside Australia.13 
Subsection 2 permits the transfer, processing, or handling of data outside of 
Australia if such records do not include “personal information in relation to a 
consumer” or “identifying information of an individual or entity.”14 
In essence, under these provisions, foreign companies handling 
health-related information must build data centers or outsource to local 
services inside Australia. It also raises practical issues for users who wish to 
access their data from overseas.15 
B. Brazil 
In 2011, Brazil’s Congress began considering the Marco Civil da Internet, 
a landmark bill that would guarantee Brazilians a significant array of civil 
 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. s 77(1). 
 14 Id. s 77(2). 
 15 An Australian local healthcare provider worried that the law would be difficult to operationalize in a 
world where Australians carried mobile devices as they traveled overseas. CSC, CSC’S SUBMISSION TO THE 
STANDING COMMITTEE ON COMMUNITY AFFAIRS: INQUIRY INTO THE PROVISIONS OF THE PERSONALLY 
CONTROLLED ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS BILL 2011 AND A RELATED BILL 7 (2011), available at https:// 
senate.aph.gov.au/submissions/comittees/viewdocument.aspx?id=f9019a89-8166-42a4-b733-3b7d87f4afc3. 
The provider observed, “Consumers will access their data via mobile devices overseas and this will result in 
data, de facto, being accessed and potentially held or cached, outside of Australia.” Id.; see also Josh Taylor, 
E-health Law to Block Overseas Access: CSC, ZDNET (Jan. 9, 2012, 06:04 GMT), http://www. 
zdnet.com/e-health-law-to-block-overseas-access-csc-1339329216/ (examining CSC’s submission to 
parliament). 
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rights online.16 Some in the Internet community described it as an 
“anti-ACTA,” referring to the proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
that would have enhanced government and private powers on behalf of 
intellectual property holders.17 Others described the bill as a “ground-breaking 
internet bill of rights.”18 
After the NSA surveillance revealed that the U.S. had surveilled both 
President Dilma Rousseff and Brazil’s largest company, Petrobras,19 a new 
version of the bill was introduced by House of Representatives Framework 
Rapporteur Alessandro Molon (Workers Party Member from Rio de Janeiro) at 
the request of President Rousseff.20 This version included a new power for the 
executive branch: the ability to require that data about Brazilians be stored in 
Brazil.21 Article 12 of the new proposed Marco Civil provided as follows: 
The Executive branch, through Decree, may force connection 
providers and Internet applications providers provided for in art. 11, 
who exercise their activities in an organized, professional and 
economic way, to install or use structures for storage, management 
 
 16 See Letter from Dean C. Garfield, President & CEO, Info. Tech. Indus. Council, to the Honorable 
Gleisi Helena Hoffmann, Minister, Casa Civil, Presidency of the Republic (Aug. 5, 2013), available at 
http://www.itic.org/dotAsset/2a6d7008-9c61-4f7c-917a-5fe4ad493527.pdf. The Marco Civil was inspired by 
the work of Ronaldo Lemos. See Ronaldo Lemos, Internet brasileira precisa de marco regulatório civil 
[Brazilian Internet Needs Civil Regulatory Framework], UOL (May 22, 2007, 21h13), http://tecnologia.uol. 
com.br/ultnot/2007/05/22/ult4213u98.jhtm (Braz.). 
 17 See Glyn Moody, Brazil Drafts an ‘Anti-ACTA’: A Civil Rights-Based Framework for the Internet, 
TECHDIRT (Oct. 4, 2011, 1:12 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20111004/04402516196/brazil-drafts-
anti-acta-civil-rights-based-framework-internet.shtml. 
 18 Everything is Connected, ECONOMIST, Jan. 5, 2013, at 17, available at http://www.economist.com/ 
news/briefing/21569041-can-internet-activism-turn-real-political-movement-everything-connected. 
 19 See Glenn Greenwald, Robert Kaz & José Casado, EUA Espionaram Milhões de E-mails e Ligações 
de Brasileiros [US Spied on Millions of Emails and Calls from Brazil], O GLOBO MUNDO (Dec. 7, 2013, 
19:50), http://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/eua-espionaram-milhoes-de-mails-ligacoes-de-brasileiros-8940934#ix 
zz2lEHZqYwh (Braz.); Angelica Mari, Brazilian Government Tries to Deal with NSA Spying, ZDNET (July 8, 
2013, 17:06 GMT), http://www.zdnet.com/brazilian-government-tries-to-deal-with-nsa-spying-7000017771/; 
Jonathan Watts, NSA Accused of Spying on Brazilian Oil Company Petrobras, GUARDIAN (Sept. 9, 2013, 
11:55 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/09/nsa-spying-brazil-oil-petrobras; Brian Winter, 
Exclusive: Brazil’s Rousseff Wants U.S. Apology for NSA Spying, REUTERS, Sept. 4, 2013, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/04/us-usa-security-snowden-brazil-idUSBRE98314N20130904. 
 20 Brazilian President Pursues Server Localization Policies, WHITE & CASE LLP (Jan. 2014), 
http://www.whitecase.com/alerts-01082014-2/#.VFU9lPTF9pY; see also Dilma Rousseff, President of the 
Federative Republic of Brazil, Statement at the Opening of the General Debate of the 68th Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 24, 2013), available at http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/ 
files/gastatements/68/BR_en.pdf [hereinafter Statement by Dilma Rousseff]. 
 21 Substitutivo ao Projeto de Lei n. 2126 de 2011 [Substitutive Bill Proposal to Draft Law No. 2126 of 
2011], translation available at http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/MC_Eng_CR_ 
Nov_13_2013.docx (Carolina Rossini, trans.). 
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and dissemination of data in the country, considering the size of the 
providers, its sales in Brazil and breadth of the service offering to the 
Brazilian public.22 
Internet companies found in violation could face a “fine of up to ten percent of 
the [previous year’s] gross revenues” from their activities in Brazil.23 After 
consideration, however, the Marco Civil was passed into law on April 23, 
2014, without the much-debated data localization provision.24 
C. Canada 
While Canada’s national law, the Personal Information Protection and 
Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA),25 does not prohibit the transfer of 
personal data outside of Canada, cross-border data flow faces provincial 
prohibitions. These provincial restraints developed out of attempts to outsource 
government information technology services to providers based in the United 
States.26 While these rules were formulated long before the Snowden 
revelations, they were justified by increases in the U.S. government’s 
surveillance power provided in the USA PATRIOT Act.27 
Two Canadian provinces, British Columbia and Nova Scotia, have enacted 
laws requiring that personal information held by public institutions—schools, 
universities, hospitals, government-owned utilities, and public agencies—be 
stored and accessed only in Canada unless one of a few limited exceptions 
applies.28 
British Columbia’s 1996 Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy 
Act states, “A public body must ensure that personal information in its custody 
 
 22 Id. art. 12. 
 23 Id. art. 13. 
 24 See Philippe Bradley & Dan Cooper, Brazil Enacts “Marco Civil” Internet Civil Rights Bill, 
INSIDEPRIVACY (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.insideprivacy.com/international/brazil-enacts-marco-civil-
internet-civil-rights-bill/ (blog maintained by Covington & Burling discussing the Marco Civil law). 
 25 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5 (Can.). 
 26 See FRED H. CATE, CTR. FOR INFO. POLICY LEADERSHIP, PROVINCIAL CANADIAN GEOGRAPHIC 
RESTRICTIONS ON PERSONAL DATA IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 3–4 (2008), available at http://www.hunton.com/ 
files/Publication/2a6f5831-07b6-4300-af8d-ae30386993c1/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/0480e5b9-
9309-4049-9f25-4742cc9f6dce/cate_patriotact_white_paper.pdf. 
 27 See id. 
 28 See Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 165, s. 30.1 (Can.), 
available at http://www.bclaws.ca/Recon/document/ID/freeside/96165_00; Personal Information International 
Disclosure Protection Act, S.N.S. 2006, c. 3, s. 5(1) (Can.), available at http://www.canlii.org/en/ns/laws/stat/ 
sns-2006-c-3/latest/sns-2006-c-3.html. 
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or under its control is stored only in Canada and accessed only in Canada.”29 
Exceptions to this requirement include situations in which the data subject “has 
identified the information and has consented . . . to it being stored in or 
accessed from . . . another jurisdiction.”30 Nova Scotia provides a similar 
localization mandate,31 but its law also permits storage or access outside of 
Canada if the “head of a public body” determines that it is necessary for the 
public body’s operation.32 
Consider the implications of British Columbia’s rule for the use of a 
foreign email service. If an individual uses Google’s Gmail (presumably based 
in the United States), not only would she have to consent to the transfer of 
information to the United States, but every Canadian she talks about in her 
Gmail email messages would have to consent as well.33 
D. China 
Localization obligations exist in certain Chinese sector-specific operations. 
In 2011, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) issued a Notice to Urge Banking 
Financial Institutions to Protect Personal Financial Information.34 Chinese 
banks and foreign invested commercial banking institutions “are required to 
observe [this Notice] when collecting, processing and storing personal 
financial information (PFI).”35 The Notice “prohibits Banks from storing, 
processing or analysing outside China any PFI which has been collected in 
China, or providing PFI collected in China to an offshore entity.”36 Banks 
outsourcing their data outside of China need to pay special attention to this 
requirement, especially as the Notice defines PFI very broadly, including 
 
 29 Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, at c. 165, s. 30.1. 
 30 Id. s. 30.1(a). 
 31 Personal Information International Disclosure Protection Act, S.N.S. 2006, at c. 3, s. 5(1)(a)–(b). 
 32 Id. s. 5(2). 
 33 See CHANDER, supra note 6, at 6. 
 34 Zhongguorenmin Yinhang Guanyu Yinhangye Jinrong Jigou Zuo Hao Geren Jinrong Xinxi Baohu 
Gongzuo de Tongzhi (中国人民银行关于银行业金融机构做好个人金融信息保护工作的通知) [Notice on 
Urging Banking Financial Institutions to Do a Good Job in Protecting Personal Financial Information] 
(promulgated by the People’s Bank of China, Jan. 21, 2011) (Lawinfochina) (China), available at http://www. 
lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=8837&CGid=; Gigi Cheah, Protection of Personal Financial 
Information in China, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/ 
knowledge/publications/56148/protection-of-personal-financial-information-in-china. 
 35 See Cheah, supra note 34. 
 36 See id.  
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personal information of identity, property, account, credit, financial 
transaction, etc.37 
In 2013, the Chinese government issued the Information Security 
Technology Guidelines for Personal Information Protection within Public and 
Commercial Services Information Systems (the Guidelines).38 Although the 
Guidelines are a voluntary technical guidance document,39 they might serve as 
a regulatory baseline for Chinese judicial authorities and lawmakers.40 The 
Guidelines prohibit the transfer of personal data abroad without express 
consent of the data subject or explicit regulatory approval. Article 5.4.5 of the 
Guidelines provides as follows: 
 
 37 See id. The United States Federal Reserve has simply asked banks to examine the risks associated with 
outsourcing, whether within the United States or offshore. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 
GUIDANCE ON MANAGING OUTSOURCING RISK (2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
bankinforeg/srletters/sr1319a1.pdf. 
 38 On July 16, 2013, China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) promulgated the 
Provisions on Protecting the Personal Information of Telecommunication and Internet Users (the Provisions), 
which went into effect on September 1, 2013. Dianxin He Hulianwangyonghu Geren Xinxi Baohu Guiding (电
信和互联网用户个人信息保护规定) [Provisions on Protecting the Personal Information of 
Telecommunications and Internet Users] (promulgated by the Ministry of Indus. & Info. Tech. July 16, 2013, 
effective, Sept. 1, 2013) (Lawinfochina) (China), available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/display 
.aspx?id=14971&lib=law&SearchKeyword=personal%20information&SearchCKeyword=. The Provisions 
provide implementing rules for the Decision on Strengthening Protection of Online Information (the Decision), 
a national law issued in December 2012. See China Dives into Data Protection Regulation, TAYLORWESSING 
(Apr. 2013), http://www.taylorwessing.com/globaldatahub/article_china_dp.html (“The [National People’s 
Congress] rolled out its Decision on Strengthening Internet Information Protection (Decision) on 28 December 
2012.”); see also MIIT Issues Comprehensive Regulation on Collection and Use of Personal Information by 
Internet and Telecommunication Service Providers, LEHMAN, LEE & XU, http://www.lehmanlaw.com/ 
resource-centre/faqs/information-technology/miit-issues-comprehensive-regulation-on-collection-and-use-of-
personal-information-by-internet-and-telecommunication-service-providers.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2015). 
These provisions are in addition to the Information Security Technology Guidelines for Personal Information 
Protection within Public and Commercial Services Information Systems, promulgated on January 21, 2013, 
which became effective February 1, 2013. A translation of these Guidelines composed by Dr. George Yijun 
Tian, in addition to an overview of them, can be found in Graham Greenleaf & George Yijun Tian, China 
Expands Data Protection through 2013 Guidelines, PRIVACY L. & BUS. INT’L REP., Apr. 2013, at 1 (2013), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2280037 [hereinafter Guidelines]. 
 39 Daniel Cooper, Eric Carlson & Scott Livingston, China Releases New National Standard for Personal 
Information Collected over Information Systems, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www. 
cov.com/files/Publication/a180859b-c1ab-4ecf-a274-e6d1a7b5fb2e/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/c8 
aad899-85f3-4d26-bb06-f0518ee09e20/China_Releases%20_New_National_Standard_for_Personal_ 
Information_Collected_Over_Information_Systems.pdf. 
 40 Gao Chiyang, Deputy Director of China Software Testing Center, who drafted the Guidelines, noted 
that even though the Guidelines are voluntary, they can provide principles for upcoming legislations. See Zhao 
Zie (赵杰), Geren Xinxi Baohu Lifa Shang wu Shijianbiao Qiye Cheng Xiemi Zhu Qyudao (个人信息保护立
法尚无时间表 企业成泄密主渠道) [Personal Information Protection Legislation: There is No Timetable in 
the Main Channel of Business], CHINA SEC. J. (Apr. 20, 2012, 13:57), http://www.cs.com.cn/ 
xwzx/sz/201204/t20120420_3325052.html. 
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Absent express consent of the subject of the personal information, or 
explicit legal or regulatory permission, or absent the consent of the 
competent authorities, the administrator of personal information must 
not transfer the personal information to any overseas receiver of 
personal information, including any individuals located overseas or 
any organizations and institutions registered overseas.41 
The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets 
prevents data from being removed from China if it is deemed to contain a state 
secret.42 “State secrets” are “matters that have a vital bearing on state security 
and national interests,”43 and include “secrets in national economic and social 
development,” “secrets concerning science and technology,” and even 
“[s]ecrets of political parties.”44 
E. European Union 
The European Union’s 1995 Data Protection Directive recognized that the 
free flow of data across borders was necessary to commerce.45 At the same 
time, it sought to ensure that data about Europeans was well protected as it 
traveled the world.46 Accordingly, it allowed data to be sent outside the 
European Union (or the European Free Trade Association states) if it were 
protected adequately either by local law or by contractual arrangement with the 
foreign company.47 To date, the European Commission has found eleven 
 
 41 Guidelines, supra note 38, at art 5.4.5. 
 42 See Tom Antisdel & Tarek Ghalayini, The Challenge of Conducting Data Collections and 
Investigations Under Unclear Data Privacy Rules, CHINA BUS. REV., Oct.–Dec. 2011, at 46, 48, available at 
http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/the-challenge-of-conducting-data-collections-and-investigations-under-
unclear-data-privacy-rules/. 
 43 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Baoshou Guojia Mimi Fa (中华人民共和国保守国家秘密法) [Law of 
the People’s Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Sept. 5, 1988, effective May 1, 1989), art. 2 (Lawinfochina) (China), available at http://www. 
lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=1191&CGid=. 
 44 Id. art. 8. 
 45 See Directive 95/46, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 36–37 [hereinafter Council Directive] (“Whereas cross-border flows of personal 
data are necessary to the expansion of international trade . . . .”). 
 46 See id. at 31 (showing that the establishment and functioning of an internal market in which, in 
accordance with Article 7a of the Treaty, the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital is ensured 
requires not only that personal data should be able to flow freely from one Member State to another but also 
that the fundamental rights of individuals should be safeguarded). 
 47 See id. at 37, 45–46. The Data Protection Directive typically limits the transfer of data outside the 
European Union or the European Free Trade Association unless the country to which it is exported has been 
adjudged by the European Commission as providing “an adequate level of protection” for data or where the 
foreign processor agrees to contractual protections for the data. See id. 
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jurisdictions as having adequate protection: Andorra, Argentina, Canada, 
Faeroe Islands, Guernsey, Israel, the Isle of Man, Jersey, New Zealand, 
Switzerland, and Uruguay.48 Given the amount of information exchanged with 
the United States, the European Union negotiated a special Safe Harbor with 
the United States, allowing data to be exported to companies in the United 
States that abide by certain data protection standards, under the supervision of 
the Federal Trade Commission.49 Recently, however, the European Union has 
been reconsidering the Safe Harbor, alongside a major effort to rewrite 
European Union privacy law altogether.50 The EU parliamentarian in charge of 
steering the European Commission’s proposed data protection reform, 
Jan-Philipp Albrecht, released a report in 2013 recommending that the EU 
discontinue the Safe Harbor framework after enacting major privacy reforms.51 
After the NSA revelations broke, Vice President Viviane Reding declared that 
the Safe Harbor agreement “may not be so safe after all.”52 The European 
Parliament also requested the European Commission to review the Safe 
Harbor.53 On November 27, 2013, the Commission published a set of 
recommendations that it asked the United States Department of Commerce to 
consider, with the possibility left open that the Safe Harbor might be 
suspended.54 
 
 48 See Commission Decisions on the Adequacy of the Protection of Personal Data in Third Countries, 
EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/international-transfers/adequacy/ 
index_en.htm (last updated Feb. 6, 2015). 
 49 For the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles themselves, see Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and 
Transmission to European Commission, 65 Fed. Reg. 45666 (Dep’t of Commerce July 24, 2000) (notice). 
 50 Stephen Gardner, Lead EU Lawmaker Report Seeks Changes to Proposed Data Protection Regulation, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.bna.com/lead-eu-lawmaker-n17179871844/. 
 51 See Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
Data (General Data Protection Regulation), at 198, COM (2012) 11 (Nov. 21, 2013), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-2013-0402+0+DOC+ 
XML+V0//EN&language=en. 
 52 See Christopher Wolf, EU VP Reding Uses PRISM as Lever to Push Enactment of Regulation and 
Questions EU-US Safe Harbor, CHRON. DATA PROTECTION (July 19, 2013), http://www.hldataprotection.com/ 
2013/07/articles/international-eu-privacy/eu-vp-reding-uses-prism-as-lever-to-push-enactment-of-regulation-
and-questions-eu-us-safe-harbor/. 
 53 See Resolution on the US National Security Agency Surveillance Programme, Surveillance Bodies in 
Various Member States and Their Impact on EU Citizens’ Privacy, EUR. PARL. DOC. RSP 2682 (2013), 
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=P7-RC-2013-0336& 
language=EN. 
 54 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Rebuilding 
Trust in EU-US Data Flows, COM (2013) 846 final (Nov. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Rebuilding Trust in EU-US 
Data Flows], available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/com_2013_846_en.pdf; Stephen 
Gardner, U.S. Officials Respond to EU Concerns Over Safe Harbor Data Transfer Program, BLOOMBERG 
BNA (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.bna.com/us-officials-respond-n17179880742/. 
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In October 2013, the European Parliament’s Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs Committee voted to advance a sweeping reform of EU data 
protection law titled the General Data Protection Regulation (the GDPR).55 
The GDPR allows companies to transfer data outside the European Union if 
appropriate safeguards are in place, such as binding corporate rules, a valid 
“European Data Protection Seal” for both controller and recipient, standard 
data protection clauses, or contractual clauses with prior authorization from the 
member state’s data protection authority.56 The draft would prohibit the 
transfer to a country where the law permits local authorities access to personal 
data from the European Union.57 Currently, the draft is undergoing 
Parliament–Council negotiations, which were projected to conclude at the end 
of 2014.58 
F. France 
Citing both concerns about foreign surveillance and competitiveness, the 
French government has sought over the last few years to promote a local data 
center infrastructure, which some have dubbed “le cloud souverain,” or the 
sovereign cloud.59 The government has directly invested in two cloud 
computing enterprises, Numergy and Cloudwatt, with a one-third ownership 
stake in each.60 In February 2013, Minister of Industry Arnaud Montebourg 
declared his support for efforts to keep data processing in France in order to 
support domestic employment.61 Whether a subsidy to domestic enterprises is a 
 
 55 Press Release, Comm. on Civil Liberties, Justice & Home Affairs, Eur. Parliament, Civil Liberties 
MEPs Pave the Way for Stronger Data Protection in the EU (Oct. 21, 2013), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/infopress/20131021IPR22706/20131021IPR22706_en.pdf. 
 56 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of 
Individual with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General 
Data Protection Regulation), Compromise Amendments on Articles 30–91, at art. 42(1)–(4), COM (2012) 11 
(Oct. 17, 2013), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/comp_ 
am_art_30-91/comp_am_art_30-91en.pdf. 
 57 Id. art. 41, recital 82. 
 58 Q&A on EU Data Protection Reform, EUR. PARLIAMENT (Apr. 3, 2014, 09:04), http://www. 
europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/background/20130502BKG07917/20130502BKG07917_en.pdf. 
 59 See Jérôme Colombain, La France Veut Son “Cloud Souverain” [France Wants His “Sovereign 
Cloud”], FRANCE INFO (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.franceinfo.fr/high-tech/nouveau-monde/la-france-veut-
son-cloud-souverain-586813-2012-04-16. 
 60 See David Meyer, A Guide to the French National Cloud(s), GIGAOM (Nov. 18, 2013, 7:55 AM PST), 
http://gigaom.com/2013/11/18/a-guide-to-the-french-national-clouds/. 
 61 Arnaud Montebourg: «Google et Facebook agissent ainsi car il n’y a pas de règles» [Arnaud 
Montebourg: Google and Facebook are Doing this Because There are No Rules], 20 MINUTES.FR (Feb. 28, 
2013 09:29), http://www.20minutes.fr/politique/1109303-arnaud-montebourg-nous-faisons-tous-jours-lois-
citoyens-pourquoi-contre-geants-linternet. 
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violation of trade commitments is a complicated question. The Snowden 
revelations spurred an additional push by the government to localize data in 
France: if the PRISM claim “turns out to be true, it makes [it] relatively 
relevant to locate datacentres and servers in [French] national territory in order 
to better ensure data security,” the Digital Economy Minister Fleur Pellerin 
explained.62 The government’s ambition to promote a “Made in France” label 
includes efforts in cloud computing, big data, and connected devices.63 In its 
national innovation plan, the government declared its goal to “build a France of 
digital sovereignty.”64 
Proposals to tax the “collection, management and commercial exploitation 
of personal data generated by users located in France” may well be 
implemented in a form designed to discourage services located outside the 
country.65 Proponents of the tax, in fact, reveal that one goal of the tax is to 
“[p]romot[e] productivity gains and value creation in the domestic 
economy.”66 The so-called “data tax” would apply to “data derived from the 
regular and systematic monitoring of users’ activity.”67 Under the proposal, the 
tax rate would depend on the level of compliance with respect to privacy, 
potentially diminishing to zero for those that were fully compliant.68 If France 
were to declare that data processing in the United States was noncompliant, 
even when conducted under the Safe Harbor, such a tax would effectively 
 
 62 See Valéry Marchive, France Hopes to Turn PRISM Worries into Cloud Opportunities, ZDNET (June 
21, 2013, 9:02 GMT), http://www.zdnet.com/france-hopes-to-turn-prism-worries-into-cloud-opportunities-
7000017089/ (second alteration in original). 
 63 See MINISTÈRE DU REDRESSEMENT PRODUCTIF [MINISTRY OF ECON. REGENERATION], THE NEW FACE 
OF INDUSTRY IN FRANCE 51, 53, 61 (2013), available at http://www.entreprises.gouv.fr/files/files/ 
directions_services/secteurs-professionnels/industrie/nfi/NFI-anglais.pdf [hereinafter NEW FACE OF 
INDUSTRY]. President François Hollande announced a national innovation program on September 12, 2013. 
Nicholas Vinocur, Hollande Turns to Robots, Driverless Cars to Revive French Industry, REUTERS, Sept. 12, 
2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/12/us-france-industry-idUSBRE98B0HW201309 
12. 
 64 NEW FACE OF INDUSTRY, supra note 63, at 51. 
 65 PIERRE COLLIN & NICHOLAS COLIN, TASK FORCE ON TAXATION OF THE DIGITAL ECON., REPORT TO 
THE MINISTER FOR THE ECONOMY AND FINANCE, THE MINISTER FOR INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY, THE MINISTER 
DELEGATE FOR THE BUDGET AND THE MINISTER DELEGATE FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES, 
INNOVATION AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 122 (2013), available at http://www.21stcenturytaxation.com/ 
uploads/Taxation_Digital_Economy_Jan2013_France.pdf.  
 66 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 67 Id. at 123. 
 68 Id. (“The tax could take the form of a unit charge per user monitored. . . . The more ‘compliant’ the 
company’s practices are regarding the collection, management and use of data derived from users’ activity, the 
lower the unit charge would be. The charge could even be waived for the most compliant companies.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
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become a tax on the export of data.69 One report notes the possibility of “a 
global trade war taking place under the guise of taxation.”70 
Shortly after President François Hollande expressed outrage over U.S. 
spying, France adopted the Military Programming Law on December 10, 2013, 
dubbed by some “the French Patriot Act,”71 permitting both the security forces 
and intelligence services from various ministries (defense, interior, economy, 
and budget)72 to see “electronic and digital communications” in “real time.”73 
G. Germany 
On July 24, 2013, in the wake of the NSA revelations, the Conference of 
the German Data Protection Commissioners announced that they would stop 
approving international data transfers until the German government could 
guarantee that foreign national intelligence services abide by fundamental 
principles of data protection law.74 They relied on their authority from the 
 
 69 The report accompanying the proposal suggests that compliance might mean going beyond complying 
with the letter of the law. Id. at 123–24 (“It is not yet time to determine which practices could be qualified as 
‘compliant’ or ‘non-compliant.’ . . . The point is to assess whether, in addition to meeting its legal obligations, 
which it must do in any case, the company’s approach goes above and beyond compliance with the letter of the 
law.” (emphasis omitted)).  
 70 Ian Allison, Europe Cracks Down on Google, Apple, Facebook and the Data-Driven Tax Black Hole, 
INT’L BUS. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2013, 09:18 GMT), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/tax-internet-ec-oecd-google-
facebook-apple-529601 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bruno Waterfield, UK Braced for Battle 
with France over Google Data Tax, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 23, 2013, 3:42 PM BST), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
finance/newsbysector/mediatechnologyandtelecoms/10399840/UK-braced-for-battle-with-France-over-
Google-data-tax.html. 
 71 James Creedon, Privacy Concerns After Passing of “French Patriot Act,” FRANCE24 (Dec. 17, 2013), 
http://www.france24.com/en/20131212-french-patriot-act-military-programming-law-carla-bruni-nude-photos-
hacking/. 
 72 Loi 2013-1168 du 18 décembre 2013 relative à la programmation militaire pour les années 2014 à 
2019 et portant diverses dispositions concernant la défense et la sécurité nationale [Law No. 2013-1168 of 
December 18, 2013 on the Military Budget for the Years 2014–2019 and Miscellaneous Provisions for 
Defense and National Security], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE 
OF FRANCE], Dec. 19, 2013, p. 20570 (Fr.); Kim Willsher, French Officials Can Monitor Internet Users in 
Real Time Under New Law, GUARDIAN (Dec. 11, 2013, 13:18 EST), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2013/dec/11/french-officials-internet-users-real-time-law.  
 73 Willsher, supra note 72. The legislation has drawn criticism. Andréa Fradin, L’article 13 Est-il Plus 
Dangereux pour Internet que les Lois Existantes? [Section 13: Is It More Dangerous for the Internet than 
Existing Laws?], SLATE.FR (Dec. 17, 2013, 14h35), http://www.slate.fr/story/81011/loi-programmation-
militaire-danger (Fr.) (critiquing the Association of Internet Community Services, Syntec, French Federation 
of Telecoms, MEDEF, International Federation of Human Rights, La Quadrature du Net, CNIL and the 
CNNum); Alarm Over Massive Spying Provisions in New Military Programming Law, REPORTERS WITHOUT 
BORDERS (Dec. 12, 2013), http://en.rsf.org/alarm-over-massive-spying-12-12-2013,45606.html. 
 74 Press Release, Die Landesbeauftragte für Datenschutz und Informationsfreiheit [State Commissioner 
for Data Protection and Freedom of Information], Conference of Data Protection Commissioners Says that 
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Commission of the European Communities to suspend data transfers if either 
the Safe Harbor or the standard contractual clauses permitting data transfer 
have a “substantial likelihood” of violation.75 The Commissioners argued that 
the violations arose because data transferred by German companies can be 
accessed by the NSA and various other foreign intelligence services without 
complying with limitation principles (viz., need, proportionality, and 
purpose).76 
While the Commissioners sought to stop data flow outside Europe, some 
within Germany proposed to limit data flow only to routes within Germany. In 
October 2013, Deutsche Telekom (which is one-third state-owned)77 proposed 
that data between Germans be routed inside German networks.78 The idea was 
 
Intelligence Services Constitute a Mass Threat to Data Traffic Between Germany and Countries Outside 
Europe (July 24, 2013), available at http://www.bfdi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Publikationen/ 
Entschliessungssammlung/ErgaenzendeDokumente/PMDSK_SafeHarbor_Eng.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. 
 75 Commission Decision of 5 February 2010 on Standard Contractual Clauses for the Transfer of 
Personal Data to Processors Established in Third Countries under Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, 2010 O.J. (L 39) 5, 8 [hereinafter Commission Decision on Standard 
Contractual Clauses], available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:039: 
0005:0018:EN:PDF; see also Commission Decision of 27 December 2004 Amending Decision 2001/497/EC 
as Regards the Introduction of an Alternative Set of Standard Contractual Clauses for the Transfer of Personal 
Data to Third Countries, 2004 O.J. (L 385) 74, 74–75, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUri 
Serv.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:385:0074:0084:en:PDF. 
 76 German privacy regulators have taken issue with the Safe Harbor with the United States in the past. In 
2010, German regulators, through an information organization known as the Düsseldorfer Kreises [Düsseldorf 
Circle], maintained that U.S. Safe Harbor self-certifications should not be automatically be considered as 
conclusive proof of adequate protection. See BESCHLUSS DER OBERSTEN AUFSICHTSBEHÖR DEN FÜR DEN 
DATENSCHUTZ IM NICHT-ÖFFENTLICHEN BEREICH AM 28./29. APRIL 2010 IN HANNOVER, PRÜFUNG DER 
SELBST-ZERTIFIZIERUNG DES DATENIMPORTEURS NACH DEM SAFE HARBOR-ABKOMMEN DURCH DAS DATEN 
EXPORTIERENDE UNTERNEHMEN [DECISION OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES FOR PROTECTION IN 
NON-PUBLIC AREAS ON 28/29TH APRIL 2010 IN HANNOVER, CONSIDERATION OF SELF-CERTIFICATION OF 
DATA IMPORTER TO THE SAFE HARBOR AGREEMENT BY THE DATA EXPORTING COMPANY] (Apr. 28, 2010), 
available at http://www.bfdi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Publikationen/Entschliessungssammlung/Duesseldorfer 
Kreis/290410_SafeHarbor.pdf;jsessionid=34480CBEFF09F90E0916CE90C8B0E224.1_cid354?__blob=publi
cationFile; U.S.–EU Safe Harbor, ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP., June 23, 2010, at 1, available at 
http://www.willkie.com/~/media/Files/Publications/2010/06/German%20Authorities%20Issue%20Privacy%2
0Decision%20Clarif__/Files/German%20Authorities%20Issue%20Privacy%20Decision%20Clarif__/FileAtta
chment/German%20Authorities%20Issue%20Privacy%20Decision%20Clarif__.pdf; German Privacy 
Regulators Issue Decision on Data Protection and Safe-harbor Self-Certification of US Companies, DUANE 
MORRIS (June 1, 2010), http://www.duanemorris.com/alerts/Dusseldorfer_Kreis_Safe_Harbor_Privacy_ 
3680.html. For a defense of the Safe Harbor, see Damon Greer, Safe Harbor—A Framework that Works, 1 
INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 143, 146 (2011). 
 77 Cornelius Rahn & Tino Andresen, Germany Should Sell 32% Deutsche Telekom Stake, Adviser Says, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 16, 2013, 12:05 PM ET), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-12-16/germany-should-
sell-phone-stake-to-fund-networks-adviser-says.html. 
 78 Telecoms Plan Shielded European Internet, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Nov. 10, 2013), 
http://www.dw.de/telecoms-plan-shielded-european-internet/a-17217304. 
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also supported by then-Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich.79 Earlier in 
August, Deutsche Telekom launched “E-mail made in Germany,” a service 
that seeks to route data exclusively through domestic servers.80 In February 
2014, Chancellor Angela Merkel proposed that Europe build out its own 
internet infrastructure designed to keep data within Europe.81 She believed that 
“European providers [could] offer security for our citizens, so that one 
shouldn’t have to send emails and other information across the Atlantic.”82 
Some questioned whether the proposals, which would increase both network 
construction and operation costs significantly, would in fact protect data from 
foreign surveillance (an issue we return to in Part II.A below) or simply 
increase the profits of local network firms.83 
H. India 
In April 2011, the Indian Ministry of Communications and Technology 
published privacy rules implementing certain provisions of the Information 
Technology Act of 2000.84 The “Information Technology (Reasonable Security 
Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules” 
limit the transfer of “sensitive personal data or information” abroad to two 
cases—when “necessary” or when the data subject consents to the transfer 
abroad.85 Specifically, Rule 7 provides as follows: 
 
 79 See German Minister: Drop US Sites If You Fear Spying, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 3, 2013, available 
at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/german-minister-drop-google-if-you-fear-us-spying (“Whoever fears their 
communication is being intercepted in any way should use services that don’t go through American 
servers . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 80 Will It Work? German Email Companies Adopt New Encryption to Foil NSA, RT.COM (Aug. 11, 2013, 
10:54), http://rt.com/news/german-email-encryption-nsa-312/. 
 81 Merkel and Hollande Mull Secure European Communication Web, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Feb 16, 2014), 
http://www.dw.de/merkel-and-hollande-mull-secure-european-communication-web/a-17435895. 
 82 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 83 Weighing a Schengen Zone for Europe’s Internet Data, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Feb. 20, 2014), 
http://www.dw.de/weighing-a-schengen-zone-for-europes-internet-data/a-17443482. 
 84 The Information Technology Act 2000 focused on computer misuse but did not cover data security. 
Information Technology Act, 2000, No. 21, Acts of Parliament, 2000 (India). The IT (Amendment) Act 2008 
added two additional sections, Section 43A and Section 72A, to address the loss and protection of personal 
data. Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008, No. 10, Acts of Parliament, 2009 (India). 
 85 Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data 
or Information) Rules, 2011, Gazette of India, subsection II(3)(i) (Apr. 11, 2011). The rules define the type of 
information that the Act covers:  
Sensitive personal data or information of a person means such personal information which 
consists of information relating to[:]—(i) password; (ii) financial information such as Bank 
account or credit card or debit card or other payment instrument details; (iii) physical, 
physiological and mental health condition; (iv) sexual orientation; (v) medical records and 
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A body corporate or any person on its behalf may transfer sensitive 
personal data or information including any information, to any other 
body corporate or a person in India, or located in any other country, 
that ensures the same level of data protection that is adhered to by the 
body corporate as provided for under these Rules. The transfer may 
be allowed only if it is necessary for the performance of the lawful 
contract between the body corporate or any person on its behalf and 
provider of information or where such person has consented to data 
transfer.86 
Because it is difficult to establish that a transfer data abroad is “necessary,” 
this provision would effectively ban transfers abroad except when an 
individual consents. 
The Rules, however, do not make it clear how consent for onward transfer 
from the information collector to the information processor is to be obtained. 
When it comes to collecting the personal information in the first instance, the 
rules require consent provided in writing, via fax, or through email—which 
(depending on how “writing” is interpreted) could foreclose even the typical 
webpage with an “I agree” button.87 Commentators observed that the consent 
requirements were “far more restrictive” than what is required under United 
States or European Union laws.88 European Union laws require consent for 
data collection and processing generally, not special consent for transfer 
abroad.89 Special consent required for exporting data suggests that data sent to 
another country is, by that act, less safe—thus requiring special knowledge and 
approval of the data subject. Because consent for offshore transfer can be a 
significant practical hurdle, American critics of outsourcing to India have 
sought to impose a consent requirement before consumer information can be 
 
history; (vi) [b]iometric information; (vii) any detail relating to the above clauses as provided to 
body corporate for providing service; and (viii) any of the information received under above 
clauses by body corporate for processing, stored or processed under lawful contract or 
otherwise[;] provided that, any information that is freely available or accessible in public domain 
or finished under the Right to Information Act, 2005 or any other law for the time being in force 
shall not be regarded as sensitive personal data or information for the purposes of these rules. 
Id. at Rule 3. 
 86 Id. at Rule 7. 
 87 MIRIAM H. WUGMEISTER & CYNTHIA J. RICH, MORRISON & FOERSTER, INDIA’S NEW PRIVACY 
REGULATIONS 3 (2011), available at http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/110504-Indias-New-
Privacy-Regulations.pdf.  
 88 Id. at 1. 
 89 Council Directive, supra note 45, at 40. 
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sent outside the United States.90 As drafted, the Indian law seemed to ironically 
accomplish the goal of those against outsourcing to India—that is, requiring 
American companies to obtain the consent of individuals before passing their 
information to India.91 In August 2011, the Ministry of Communications & 
Information Technology clarified that the Rules were meant only to apply to 
companies gathering data of Indians, and only where the companies were 
located in India.92 While patching over one problem, the clarification may 
discourage foreign companies from investing in India because to do so would 
bring them under the purview of the Rules. (We return to the impact of data 
localization on local economic development in Part II.C below.) 
Another statute potentially poses substantial localization pressures for 
information held by the government. Section 4 of the Public Records Act of 
1993 prohibits public records from being transferred out of India territory, 
except for “public purpose[s].”93 It provides that “[n]o person shall take or 
cause to be taken out of India any public records without the prior approval of 
the Central Government; [p]rovided that no such prior approval shall be 
required if any public records are taken or sent out of India for any official 
purpose.”94 
Under the statute, “any . . . material produced by a computer” constitutes 
“public records.”95 In 2013, the Delhi High Court interpreted this requirement 
to bar the transfer of government emails outside India.96 It ordered the 
 
 90 A bill proposed in New York explicitly designed to “stem the flow of skilled and unskilled labor out of 
New York State” requires that no business transfer “personal information to or with any nonaffiliated third 
parties which are located outside the United States . . . without . . . prior written consent.” New York 
Consumer and Worker Protection Act, S. 2992, 2013 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013).  
 91 James A Harvey & Todd S. McClelland, Outsourcing and Privacy & Security Advisory—Questions 
Answered, More Questions Raised: Exploring the Outsourcing Implications of India’s Recently Released 
Privacy Rules, ALSTON & BIRD LLP (June 21, 2011), http://www.alston.com/files/publication/34af0cc7-3ec9-
4c05-b713-3692f2addf28/presentation/publicationattachment/9a608746-920d-4990-8b2b-57ef0e1a8b76/ 
outsourcing%20and%20privacy%20%26%20security%20advisory.pdf. 
 92 See Press Note, Press Info. Bureau, Gov’t of India, Clarification on Information Technology 
(Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules, 2011 Under 
Section 43A of the Information Technology ACT, 2000, (Aug. 24, 2011), available at 
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=74990; Deepa Christopher & Praveen Thomas, India – Welcome 
Clarification on Sensitive Personal Data Rules, LINKLATERS (Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.linklaters.com/ 
Insights/Publication1403Newsletter/TMT-newsletter-September-2011/Pages/India-data-security-laws.aspx. 
 93 The Public Records Act, No. 69 of 1993, § 4, INDIA CODE (1993), available at 
http://nationalarchives.nic.in/writereaddata/html_en_files/html/public_records93.html. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. § 2(e)(iv). 
 96 See Delhi HC Asks Government to Formulate an Email Policy Within 4-weeks, IBN LIVE (Oct. 30, 
2013, 3:06 PM IST), http://ibnlive.in.com/news/delhi-hc-asks-government-to-formulate-an-email-policy-
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government to formulate a policy for official government email that would 
comply with the Public Records Act.97 A draft of the “E-mail Policy of the 
Government of India” would mandate that government employees use only 
government email services, thereby preventing the use of private services 
based abroad or at home.98 The Information Technology Directorate of the 
state of Maharashtra advised all government department’s websites “should be 
hosted within India and preferably on government owned servers” and to use 
“government provided email IDs, from servers within India . . . for official 
communication by all government employees.”99 
In February 2014, the National Security Council (NSC) proposed a policy 
that might require data localization for Indian citizens, and not just government 
agencies alone. According to an NSC internal note seen by the newspaper The 
Hindu Business Line, “All email service providers may be mandated to host 
servers for their India operations in India. All data generated from within India 
should be hosted in these India-based servers and this would make them 
subject to Indian laws[.]”100 The NSC proposal would prohibit “[a]s a general 
principle, mirroring of data in these servers to main servers abroad.”101  
Moreover, the National Security Advisor has called on the Department of 
Telecom to mandate all telecom and Internet companies “to route local data 
through the National Internet Exchange of India” to ensure that domestic 
Internet packets remain mostly in India.102 The Standing Committee on 
Information Technology of the Ministry of Information noted in February 2014 
that it is “unhappy” that a “majority of the websites are still being hosted 
outside India.”103 
 
within-4weeks/431351-3-244.html; see also Delhi High Court Seeks Clear-cut Answers from Centre on Its 
Email Policy, ECON. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2014, 07:19 PM IST), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-
10-01/news/54516892_1_email-policy-k-n-govindacharya-delhi-high-court. 
 97 Delhi HC Asks Government to Formulate an Email Policy within 4-weeks, supra note 96. 
 98 STANDING COMMITTEE ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, CYBER CRIME, CYBER SECURITY AND RIGHT 
TO PRIVACY 21 (2014), available at https://www.dsci.in/sites/default/files/15_Information_Technology_ 
52.pdf. 
 99 Letter from Rajesh Aggarwal, Sec’y of Info. Tech., Directorate of Info. Tech., to all Gov. Depts. in 
Maharashtra, India 2 (Sept. 30, 2013), available at https://www.maharashtra.gov.in/Site/upload/WhatsNew/ 
Advisory%20dated%20300913.pdf. 
 100 Thomas K. Thomas, National Security Council Proposes 3-Pronged Plan to Protect Internet Users, 
HINDU BUS. LINE (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/features/smartbuy/national-security-
council-proposes-3pronged-plan-to-protect-internet-users/article5685794.ece (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 101 Id. 
 102 Thomas, supra note 3.  
 103 STANDING COMMITTEE ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, supra note 96, at 61. 
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I. Indonesia 
In 2012, the Indonesian government required service providers providing 
“public services” to place their data centers within the country. Regulation 82 
concerning “Electronic System and Transaction Operation” states, “Electronic 
System Operator for the public service is obligated to put the data center and 
disaster recovery center in Indonesian territory for the purpose of law 
enforcement, protection, and enforcement of national sovereignty to the data of 
its citizens.”104 Although the term “public services” is defined in the Public 
Service Law of 2009,105 this provision did not define exactly what kinds of 
“electronic system operators” were deemed to be in the “public service.”106 A 
Draft Regulation Concerning Registration Procedure of Electronic System 
Provider clarifies this somewhat, explaining that “public service electronic 
systems by the private business sector” include any “[o]nline gate, site or 
online application over the internet which provides an offer and/or trade of 
goods and/or service; . . . enables payment facility and/or other financial 
transaction over the data network; . . . [or] is used for paid digital content 
delivery over the data network.”107 
 On its face, this approach seems so broad that almost all websites and 
online applications such as newspapers or information and social platforms 
 
 104 Regulation Concerning Electronic System and Transaction Operation, Law No. 82 of 2012, art. 17(2) 
(Government Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia Year 2012 No. 189) (Indon.), translation available at 
TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROJECT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT FOR TRADE-RELATED ADMINISTRATION IN 
INDONESIA, http://rulebook-jica.ekon.go.id/english/4902_PP_82_2012_e.html. The Regulation serves to clarify 
the Law on Information and Electronic Transactions 2008. 
 105 Undang-Undang Tentang Pelayanan Publik [Public Service Law], Law No. 25/2009, July 18, 2009 
(Government Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia Year 2009 No. 112) (Indon.), available at 
http://www.setneg.go.id//components/com_perundangan/docviewer.php?id=2274&filename=UU%2025%20T
ahun%202009.pdf; see also Michael Buehler, Indonesia’s Law on Public Services: Changing State-Society 
Relations or Continuing Politics as Usual?, 47 BULL. INDON. ECON. STUD. 65 (2011), available at 
http://michaelbuehler.asia/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/BIESBuehler2011.pdf. 
 106 Law No. 25/2009, art. 5.7(b); Indonesia, Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries, LINKLATERS, 
https://clientsites.linklaters.com/Clients/dataprotected/Pages/Indonesia.aspx (last updated May 2014). Public 
services are services (a) provided by government agencies, (b) provided by a business entity founding capital 
partly or entirely derived from the wealth of the country, (c) provided by none of the above but whose delivery 
is part of state’s mission. In the elucidation, it was further stated that the State’s missions are: health, 
education, inter city transportation, aviation, social welfare homes, and security services. See Indonesia, 
Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries, supra. 
 107 Rancangan Peraturan Menteri (RPM) tentang Tata Cara Pendaftaran Penyelenggaraan dan Sistem 
Transaksi Elektronik [Draft Regulation Concerning the Registration Procedure of Electronic System Provider], 
art. 5, http://web.kominfo.go.id/sites/default/files/RPM%20tentang%20Tata%20Cara%20Pendaftaran%20 
Penyelenggara%20Sistem%20Elektronik.pdf (Indon.) (Pricillia Haesanny, trans., translation on file with 
authors). 
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might be “public services” because, due to the nature of service-bundling, 
these sites also often process paid digital content or offer other services. The 
Indonesian Association of E-commerce (idEA) has criticized this interpretation 
as inconsistent with regulations on public services.108 
On January 7, 2014, the Ministry of Communication circulated a Draft 
Regulation on Technical Guidelines on Data Centers, which would require 
domestic data centers for disaster recovery for a broader range of 
institutions.109 According to the Technology and Information Ministry’s Chief 
of Public Relations Gatot S. Dewa Broto, the local data center mandate “covers 
any institution that provides information technology-based services,” which as 
a prescient reporter noted, is a definition which is broad enough that it could 
include “hotels, banks, and airlines services as well as [Google and Yahoo].”110 
As we’ll describe in Part II.C below, the costs and risks associated with 
building out data centers in every country that one serves can make it 
uneconomical to do so in many cases. 
J. Malaysia 
In 2010, Malaysia passed the Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA), which 
requires data about Malaysians to be stored on local servers.111 Article 129(1) 
provides, “A data user shall not transfer any personal data of a data subject to a 
place outside Malaysia unless to such place as specified by the Minister, upon 
the recommendation of the Commissioner, by notification published in the 
Gazette.”112 The PDPA offers a set of exceptions, permitting the transfer of 
data abroad under certain conditions: the data subject has given his consent to 
the transfer; the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract between 
 
 108 Enricko Lukman, Is the Indonesian Government Hurting or Helping the E-Commerce Industry?, TECH 
IN ASIA (May 9, 2013, 5:12 PM), http://www.techinasia.com/indonesian-government-hurting-helping-
ecommerce-industry/. 
 109 Rancangan Peraturan Menteri (RPM) tentang Pedoman Teknis Pusat Data [Draft Regulation 
Concerning the Technical Guidelines for Data Centers] (2013) (Indon.), available at 
http://web.kominfo.go.id/sites/default/files/RPM%20PEDOMAN%20PUSAT%20DATA.pdf; Press Release, 
Kominfo, Siaran Pers Tentang Uji Publik RPM Data Center [Press Release About Public Test RPM Data 
Center] (Jan. 7, 2014) (Indon.), available at http://kominfo.go.id/index.php/content/detail/3731/Siaran+Pers+ 
No.+2-PIH-KOMINFO-1-2014+tentang+Uji+Publik+RPM+Data+Center+/0/siaran_pers#.UxBPWvldV6B. 
 110 Indonesia May Force Web Giants to Build Local Data Centers, ASIA SENTINEL (Jan. 17, 2014), 
http://www.asiasentinel.com/econ-business/indonesia-web-giants-local-data-centers/; see also Vanesha 
Manuturi & Basten Gokkon, Web Giants to Build Data Centers in Indonesia?, JAKARTA GLOBE (Jan. 15, 
2014, 9:35 AM), http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/web-giants-to-build-data-centers/. 
 111 Personal Data Protection Act 2010 § 129 (Act No. 709) (Malay.), available at 
http://www.kkmm.gov.my/pdf/Personal%20Data%20Protection%20Act%202010.pdf. 
 112 Id. art. 129(1).  
CHANDER_LE GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/19/2015 12:30 PM 
700 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:677 
the data subject and the data user; the transfer is necessary for the conclusion 
or performance of a contract between the data user and a third party that is 
either entered into at the request of the data subject or in his interest; the 
transfer is in the exercise of or to defend a legal right; the transfer mitigates 
adverse actions against the data subjects; reasonable precautions and all due 
diligence to ensure compliance to conditions of the Act were taken; or the 
transfer was necessary for the protection the data subject’s vital interests or for 
the public interest as determined by the Minister.113 As we have indicated 
above in our discussion of the Indian data localization obligations, a consent 
requirement for transfer abroad can be difficult to satisfy. While it officially 
entered into force on November 15, 2013, the PDPA has thus far not been 
enforced. 
K. Nigeria 
To address Nigeria’s “clear negative trade balance” in the IT sector, the 
Nigerian government has set a target of 50% locally supplied goods and 
services in the information technology sector and has sought to achieve this 
target through regulatory mandates.114 The National Information Technology 
Development Agency (NITDA) released the Guidelines for Nigerian Content 
Development in Information and Communications Technology (ICT) in 2013, 
requiring, in addition to a list of local content and usage of local hardware 
requirements, that ICT companies must “[h]ost all subscriber and consumer 
data locally within the country”115 and must “[h]ost their websites on .ng 
TLD.”116 The Guidelines also mandate that data and information management 
firms must “[h]ost government data locally within the country and shall not for 
any reason host any government data outside the country without an express 
approval.”117 The Guidelines provide a transition period for implementation.118 
 
 113 Id. art. 129(3). 
 114 Omobola Johnson, Minister of Commc’n Tech., Federal Ministry of Commc’n Tech., Remarks at the 
e-Nigeria Conference 2013 in Abuja, Nigeria (Dec. 3, 2013), available at http://enigeria.gov.ng/2013/ 
Day%201/HM%20Remarks_e_Nigeria%20Dec%2003rd%202013_v5a.pdf. 
 115 Federal Ministry of Commc’n Tech., Guidelines for Nigerian Content Development in Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT) § 12.1.4, at 19 (2013), available at http://www.nitda.gov.ng/documents/ 
Guidelines%20on%20Nigerian%20Content%20Developmenet%20in%20ICT%20updated%20on%201206201
4.pdf. 
 116 Id. § 12.1.5, at 19. 
 117 Id. § 14.1.2, at 23. 
 118 See id. § 1.0, at 4.  
CHANDER_LE GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/19/2015 12:30 PM 
2015] DATA NATIONALISM 701 
L. Russia 
Following the NSA revelations in the summer of 2013, Sergei Zheleznyak, 
a deputy speaker of the lower house of the Russian parliament and a member 
of the Committee on Information Policy and Information Technology and 
Communications, called on Russia to strengthen its “digital sovereignty” 
through “legislation requiring e-mail and social networking companies [to] 
retain the data of Russian clients on servers inside Russia, where they would be 
subject to domestic law enforcement search warrants.”119 
In spring 2013, the Minsvyazi (Russian Ministry of Communications) 
drafted an order forcing telecommunications and Internet providers “to install 
equipment allowing data collection and retention on their servers for a 
minimum of 12 hours.”120 This obligation seems to be directed not at the 
websites themselves but at Internet service providers that carry data between 
users and computer servers. By requiring Russian Internet service providers to 
save data locally, it serves as a data localization requirement, not preventing 
data from leaving but at least requiring a copy to be stored locally. This order 
gives the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) “direct access to a wider 
range of data than was possible before—including users’ phone numbers, 
account details on popular domestic and overseas online resources (like Gmail, 
Yandex, Mail.ru etc [sic]), IP addresses and location data—without a court 
order, for the purposes of national anti-terrorist investigations.”121 On July 21, 
2014, President Vladimir Putin signed Federal Law No. 242—which amended 
Federal Law No. 152 “On Personal Data” of July 27, 2006122—to prohibit the 
storing of Russians’ personal data outside the Russian Federation.123 Moreover, 
 
 119 Andrew E. Kramer, N.S.A. Leaks Revive Push in Russia to Control Net, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2013, at 
B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/15/business/global/nsa-leaks-stir-plans-in-russia-to-control-
net.html; Maria Makutina, Lawmakers Seek to Bolster Russia’s Internet Sovereignty, RUSS. BEYOND 
HEADLINES (June 21, 2013), http://rbth.ru/politics/2013/06/21/lawmakers_seek_to_bolster_russias_internet_ 
sovereignty_27365.html.  
 120 Alexandra Kulikova, Data Collection and Retention in Russia: Going Beyond the Privacy and Security 
Debate, GLOBAL PARTNERS DIGITAL (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.gp-digital.org/gpd-update/data-collection-
and-retention-in-russia/. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Personal’nykh Data [Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Personal 
Data], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] July 27, 2006, No. 152, available at http://www.rg.ru/ 
2006/07/29/personaljnye-dannye-dok.html, translation available at https://www.privacyassociation.org/ 
media/pdf/knowledge_center/Russian_Federal_Law_on_Personal_Data.pdf (Int’l Ass’n of Privacy Prof’ls, 
trans.).  
 123 Federal’nyj Zakon Rossijskoj Federacii “O Vnesenii Izmenenij v Otdel’nye Zakonodatel’nye Akty 
Rossijskoj Federacii v Časti Utočnenija Porjadka Obrabotki Personal’nyh Dannyh v Informacionno-
Telekommunikacionnyh Setjah” [Federal Law of the Russian Federation “On Amendments to Certain 
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operators of these databases must disclose the physical locations of 
datacenters.124 Online websites that violate the prohibition could be placed on 
the Roscomnadzor’s (Federal Communications Supervisory Service’s) 
blacklist of websites, generally reserved for those promoting drugs and child 
pornography.125 
This law followed on the heels of Federal Law No. 97, or the “Blogger’s 
Law,” which seeks to oversee blogging on the Internet, and introduces another 
data localization mandate.126 The legislation requires that individuals or legal 
entities who organize the dissemination of information, or the exchange of 
information between Internet users, to store all information about the arrival, 
transmission, delivery, and processing of voice data, written text, images, 
sounds, or other kinds of action for six months in Russia.127 A major firm 
noted that these “[t]wo developments in Russian law . . . could significantly 
limit the ability of cloud and other online services to publish online content and 
to make Russian data remotely available online.”128 
 
Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Regarding the Clarification of the Processing of Personal Data in 
Information and Telecommunication Networks”], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] July 23, 2014, No. 242, 
available at http://www.rg.ru/2014/07/23/persdannye-dok.html; see also Maria Puzrakova, Recent 
Amendments to the Procedure of Personal Data Processing in Russia, WHITE & CASE LLP (Sept. 2014), 
http://www.whitecase.com/articles/092014/recent-amendments-to-the-procedure-of-personal-data-processing-
in-russia/#.VEl-NskhCkM; Leonid Zubarev & Elena Baryshnikova, The Storage and Processing of Russian 
Citizens’ Personal Data in Databases Located Outside Russia to be Banned, CMS (Aug. 2014), 
http://www.cms-russia.info/legalnews/2014/07/cms_client_alert_2014_07_31.html (explaining Russian 
citizens’ personal data will only be stored on Russian Databases and noting exceptions such as when there is 
interference to achieving objectives of international treaties and the administration of justice). 
 124 Federal Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation, art. 2.2. 
 125 Max Smolaks, Russian Government Will Force Companies to Store Citizen Data Locally, TECHWEEK 
EUROPE (July 4, 2014, 17:22), http://www.techweekeurope.co.uk/news/russian-government-will-force-
companies-store-citizen-data-locally-148560. 
 126 Federal’nyj Zakon “O Vnesenii Izmenenij v Federal’nyj zakon, ‘Ob Informacii, Informacionnyh 
Tehnologijah i o Zaŝite Informacii’ i Otdel’nye Zakonodatel’nye akty Rossijskoj Federacii po Voprosam 
Uporjadočenija Obmena Informaciej s Ispol’zovaniem Informacionno-Telekommunikacionnyh Setej” [Federal 
Law “On Amending the Federal Law ‘On Information, Information Technologies and Protection of 
Information’ and Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation on Streaming the Exchange of 
Information with the Use of Information-Telecommunications Networks”], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] 
May 5, 2014, art. 1.1, available at http://www.rg.ru/2014/05/07/informtech-dok.html. For a general overview 
of the regulation, see Natalia Gulyaeva & Maria Sedykh, Russia Enacts Data Localization Requirement; New 
Rules Restricting Online Content Come into Effect, HOGAN LOVELLS (July 18, 2014), 
http://www.hldataprotection.com/2014/07/articles/international-eu-privacy/russia-enacts-new-online-data-
laws/. 
 127 See Federal Law of May 5, 2014, art. 1.1; see also Russia’s Parliament Prepares New “Anti-
Terrorist” Laws for Internet, GLOBAL VOICES (Jan. 16, 2014, 5:51 GMT), http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline. 
org/2014/01/16/russias-parliament-prepares-new-anti-terrorist-laws-for-internet-censorship-putin/.  
 128 Gulyaeva & Sedykh, supra note 126.  
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M. South Korea 
In March 2011, South Korea promulgated a comprehensive regulation on 
data through the Personal Information Protection Act, covering both the private 
and public sectors.129 Article 17(3) of the Act targets data exports for a special 
protection regime: “When a personal information manager provides a third 
person at any overseas location with personal information, he/she shall notify a 
subject of information of the matters referred to . . . and obtain the consent 
thereto.”130 
The law requires the data exporter to provide the data subject (the person to 
whom the data relates) with extensive information about the data transfer. 
Article 17(2) provides that data subjects must be informed of the following: 
1. A recipient of personal information; 2. Purposes for which a 
recipient of personal information uses such information; 3. Items of 
personal information to provide; 4. Period for which a recipient of 
personal information holds and uses such information; 5. The fact 
that a subject of information has a right to reject to give his/her 
consent and details of a disadvantage, if any, due to his/her rejection 
to give consent.131 
As we described in the discussion of similar rules in India, these obligations 
significantly limit the use of foreign cloud computing services and also third 
party information services providers generally. 
Another data localization measure comes from an unexpected source. In 
1961, post-war South Korea enacted the Land Survey Act seeking, among 
other things, to prevent hostile powers from obtaining maps of the country.132 
Similar provisions were replaced in 2009 by the Act on Land Survey, 
 
 129 Gaein jeong boboho beop [Personal Information Protection Act], Act. No. 10465, Mar. 29, 2011, art 1, 
amended by Act. No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013 (S. Kor.), translated in 33 STATUTES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
(Korea Legislation Res. Inst. 2014), available at http://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq 
=22038&lang=ENG. The Personal Information Protection Act replaced the Public Agency Data Protection Act 
and—in part in relation to the private sector—the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications 
Network Utilization and Information Protection. 
 130 Id. art. 17(3).  
 131 Id. art. 17(2).  
 132 Land Survey Act, Act. No. 938, Dec. 31, 1961, art. 16 (forbidding records of survey measurements and 
pictures of maps from being taken out of the country), repealed by Act on Land Survey, Waterway Survey and 
Cadastral Records, Act. No. 9774, June 9, 2009 (S. Kor.). For the current version of the law in force, see Act 
on Land Survey, Waterway Survey and Cadastral Records, Act. No. 12738, June 3, 2014 (S. Kor.), translated 
in 31 STATUTES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (Korea Legislation Res. Inst. 2014), available at 
http://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=32771&lang=ENG. 
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Waterway Survey and Cadastral Records, which has been amended several 
times, most recently in 2014. According to Article 16 of the Act, 
(1) No person shall take abroad maps, etc. . . . without permission of 
the Minster of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs . . . 
(2) No person shall take abroad the results of a fundamental survey 
where [the act would harm national security or other important 
national interests or where such information is prescribed as a 
confidential matter].133 
The constraint in this law continues to this day,134 and it has been 
interpreted recently as outlawing mapping data from being held on computer 
servers outside the country.135 This has effectively limited the provision of 
online mapping services to Korean Internet companies such as Naver and 
Daum and not foreign companies that use foreign servers. A Japanese tourist, 
for example, found that she could not use Google Maps to navigate in South 
Korea.136 The constraints also pose a hurdle to companies that provide services 
built on top of the foreign services’ APIs (application programming interfaces), 
thereby hampering the development of domestic innovations using global 
tools, an issue we return to in Part II.C below. 
N. Vietnam 
In 2013, the Vietnamese government promulgated a lengthy and 
comprehensive decree seeking to control speech on the Internet. The Decree on 
Management, Provision, and Use of Internet Services and Information Content 
Online (Decree 72),137 which became effective on September 1, 2013, bans the 
use of the Internet to criticize the government or to do anything else to harm 
“national security, social order and safety.”138 Decree 72 also requires a range 
of Internet service providers to maintain within Vietnam a copy of any 
 
 133 Act. No. 12738, June 3, 2014, art. 16 (concerning the results from a “fundamental survey”); see also 
id. art. 21 (concerning the results from a “public survey”). 
 134 See supra note 133. 
 135 See Geun Ho LiIm, Hangyeong → Seouryeok Geomsaek Haessdeoni. . .Geonmul Wiro Naragarago? 
Hangug Eseoman Gil Moschajneun Gugeuljido [Searching Directions from HanKyung to Seoul Station. . .Fly 
over Buildings? Google Map Cannot Navigate only in Korea], KOREA ECON. DAILY (Dec. 9, 2013, 21:10:50), 
http://www.hankyung.com/news/app/newsview.php?aid=2013120998951 (S. Kor.). 
 136 Id. 
 137 Decree on Management, Provision and Use of Internet Services and Online Information (No. 72/2013) 
(Viet.), available at http://www.moit.gov.vn/Images/FileVanBan/_ND72-2013-CPEng.pdf. 
 138 Id. art. 5(1)(a) (declaring it illegal to use the Internet to “[oppose] the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
[or] threaten[] the national security, social order and safety”). 
CHANDER_LE GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/19/2015 12:30 PM 
2015] DATA NATIONALISM 705 
information they hold in order to facilitate the inspection of information by 
authorities, specifically, providing that organizations and enterprises must 
“have at least [one] server system in Vietnam serving the inspection, storage, 
and provision of information at the request of competent authorities.”139 
The Decree applies to general websites, social networks, mobile networks, 
and game service providers.140 Unlike many other countries, Vietnam’s focus 
is not in protecting the privacy of the information from foreign surveillance but 
in ensuring that information is available to local authorities that want ready 
access to it. 
In October 2013, the Ministry of Information and Communications 
circulated a draft circular providing additional implementation details for 
Decree 72. The draft circular again affirms that a central goal of that decree is 
to assist local authorities in accessing information. The draft circular requires 
that the local server must meet the following requirements: 
1. Storing all user registration information that allows users to 
connect and authenticate user information with personal 
identification number system at the request of the competent 
state agencies. 
2. Storing the entire history of the information posting activities on 
the general information websites and user information provision 
and sharing on social networks. 
3. Allowing the conduct and storage of all the activities relating to 
censoring information posted on general information websites 
and social networks. 
4. When there are requirements arising from the server system 
located in Viet Nam, the entire server system located outside 
Viet Nam must meet those requirements. 
5. Permitting full conduct of inspection and examination activities 
at any given time as required by the competent authority as well 
as the settlement of users’ complaints in accordance with the 
user agreements of general information websites, social 
networks, and relevant regulations.141 
 
 139 Id. art. 24(2). 
 140 See id. (general websites); id. art. 25(8) (social networks); id. art. 28(2) (mobile networks); 
id. art. 34(2) (game service providers). 
 141 Draft Circular Detailing a Number of Articles re Management of Websites and Social Networks under 
the Government’s Decree No. 72/2013/ND-CP of 15 July 2013 Regarding the Management, Provision and Use 
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The draft circular also requires that any “general information website” or 
social network must have a high-level person responsible for content 
management who must be a Vietnamese national and reside in Vietnam.142 
Thus, not only must the data reside in Vietnam, so must a high-level executive 
of the company. 
O. Others 
Kazakhstan—Since 2005, Kazakhstan has required that all domestically 
registered domain names (i.e., those on the “.kz” top level domain) operate on 
physical servers within the country.143 The government took steps to enforce 
this regulation in late 2010, causing Google to redirect traffic from Google.kz 
to Google.com.144 The redirect caused search queries to return results that were 
not customized for Kazakhstan.145 The Kazakhstani Association of IT 
Companies later required that the domestic server requirements apply only to 
new domains registered after September 7, 2010.146 This allowed Google 
(which had registered its name well before this date) to restore the Google.kz 
site, but domestic or foreign companies registering a domain name after this 
date could no longer rely on global cloud-based services. 
Scandinavian Countries—The Scandinavian data protection authorities 
have expressed concerns about the use of foreign cloud computing services, 
 
of Internet Services and Online Information, Vietnamese Ministry of Information and Communication, 
available at http://mic.gov.vn/Attachment%20Lay%20Y%20Kien%20Nhan%20Dan/Du%20thao%20thong% 
20tu%20MXH%20(Du%20thao%203%20ngay%204.%209).doc (translation by author). 
 142 Id. art. 3. This provision sets forth conditions for granting a license to establish general information 
websites and social networks, which include the following specifications: 
1. Management personnel: 
The person responsible for content management is the head of the organization, the head of 
the enterprise or the person who is authorized by the head of an organization, the head of an 
enterprise. The authorized person must be deputy head-level in an organization and an enterprise; 
must have Vietnamese nationality, permanent residence or temporary residence address in 
Vietnam, and must be an university graduate or equivalents or higher . . . . 
Id. 
 143 FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 8, at 441. 
 144 Bill Coughran, Changes to the Open Internet in Kazakhstan, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (June 14, 2011, 
7:40 PM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/changes-to-open-internet-in-kazakhstan.html (“[T]he 
Kazakhstan Network Information Centre notified us of an order issued by the Ministry of Communications and 
Information in Kazakhstan that requires all .kz domain names, such as google.kz, to operate on physical 
servers within the borders of that country.”). 
 145 Id.  
 146 See id.; see also Google.kz Vernulsya v Kazakhstan [Google.kz Returned to Kazakhstan], 
TENGRINEWS.KZ (June 15, 2011, 10:20), http://tengrinews.kz/internet/190571/ (Kaz.). 
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though their interpretations have been largely untested in court. In 2011, the 
Danish Data Protection Agency denied the city of Odense permission to 
transfer “data concerning health, serious social problems, and other purely 
private matters” to Google Apps, citing security concerns.147 In 2012, the 
Norwegian data authority concluded that cities could not use cloud computing 
services unless the servers were located within the EU, but then lifted the ban 
on the use of Google Apps a short time later.148 
Sweden’s Datainspektionen (Data Inspection Board) has given a number of 
interpretations on whether the use of services that place data abroad violates 
Swedish data processing law. It concluded that the town of Salem could not 
use Google cloud services, in part because Google could not guarantee that any 
subcontractor they used abroad would follow the Safe Harbor.149 Google’s 
standard enterprise contract, however, promises that any subcontractor will 
meet the standards of the Safe Harbor, and Google also provides for the 
possibility that it will follow the Model Contract Clauses established by the 
European Commission to meet the requirements of European data protection 
law.150 The Datainspektionen did eventually approve the use of Dropbox, a 
U.S.-based cloud service.151 
 
 147 Processing of Sensitive Personal Data in a Cloud Solution, DATATILSYNET (Feb. 3, 2011), 
http://www.datatilsynet.dk/english/processing-of-sensitive-personal-data-in-a-cloud-solution/. 
 148 See Norwegian Data Inspectorate, Notification of Decision – New E-mail Solution Within Narvik Local 
Authority (Narvik Commune) – Google Apps, DATATILSYNET (Jan. 16, 2012), http://www.datatilsynet.no/ 
Global/english/2012_narvik_google_eng.pdf (decision to ban service); Use of Cloud Computing Services, 
DATATILSYNET (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.datatilsynet.no/English/Publications/cloud-computing/ (reporting 
on the decision to lift the ban); see also Loek Essers, Norway Ends Nine-Month Ban on Google Apps, 
COMPUTERWORLD (Sept. 26, 2012, 2:27 PM PT), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2491685/cloud-
computing/norway-ends-nine-month-ban-on-google-apps-use.html. 
 149 Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Data Protection in Cloud Computing – The Swedish Perspective, 28 
COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 476, 476–77 (2012); Tillsyn enligt personuppgiftslagen (1998:204) – 
Uppföljning av beslut i ärende 263-2011 [Supervision Under the Personal Data Act (1998: 204) – Monitoring 
of Decision in Case 263-2011], DATAINSPEKTIONEN (May 31, 2013), http://www.datainspektionen.se/ 
Documents/beslut/2013-05-31-salems-kommun.pdf (Swed.); Liam Tung, Sweden Tells Council to Stop Using 
Google Apps, ZDNET (June 14, 2013, 13:46 GMT), http://www.zdnet.com/sweden-tells-council-to-stop-using-
google-apps-7000016850/. Also, in 2013, the Datainspektionen refused to endorse the Sollentuna 
municipality’s cloud service contract with Google, though that interpretation too is being contested. See Jonas 
Ryberg, Storbråk om Google Apps [Large Fraction of Google Apps], COMPUTERSWEDEN (Sept. 17, 2013, 
09:45), http://computersweden.idg.se/2.2683/1.523293/storbrak-om-google-apps (Swed.). 
 150 Data Processing Amendment to Google Apps Enterprise Agreement, GOOGLE, https://www.google. 
com/intx/en/enterprise/apps/terms/dpa_terms.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2015). The Model Contract Clauses 
provide for “prior written consent” before the use of subprocessors by the data importer. See Commission 
Decision on Standard Contractual Clauses, supra note 75.  
 151 Svantesson, supra note 149, at 479. 
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Taiwan—Article 21 of Taiwan’s Personal Data Protection Act152 permits 
government agencies the authority to restrict international transfers in the 
industries they regulate, under certain conditions such as when the information 
involves major national interests, by treaty or agreement, inadequate 
protection, or when the foreign transfer is utilized to avoid Taiwanese laws.153 
Thailand—Thailand is considering a comprehensive data protection 
framework.154 The draft Personal Information Protection Act would require 
that before an overseas data transfer is executed, the data subjects must give 
specific consent in writing to overseas transfers, and the recipient country’s 
personal data protection law must be deemed adequate.155 
P. Summary of Data Localization Mandates 
We summarize below the means employed and rationales offered for the 
data localization mandates that are in place or being considered in the 
jurisdictions surveyed. 
 
Country Regulation Rationale Cited 
Australia Section 77 of the Personally Controlled 
Electronic Health Records (PCEHR) Act 
prohibits the transfer of health records outside 
of Australia. 
 
Users’ privacy and 
security 
 
 152 Taiwan passed the Computer-Processed Personal Data Protection Law (CPPDP) and associated rules 
in 1995. In 2010, the CPPDP was amended and renamed the Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA). 
PIPA came into effect on October 1, 2012.  
 153 Personal Information Protection Act (promulgated by the Ministry of Justice, May 26, 2010), art. 21 
(Taiwan), available at http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=I0050021. The act provides 
for the following exceptions:  
1. Where it involves major national interests; 2. Where [a] national treaty or agreement specifies 
otherwise; 3. Where the country receiving personal information lacks of proper regulations 
towards the protection of personal information and it might harm the rights and interests of the 
Party; 4. Where international transmission of personal information is made through an indirect 
method in which the provisions of this Law may not be applicable. 
Id. Taiwan’s National Communications Commission issued an order prohibiting all Taiwanese 
telecommunications and broadcasting industries from transferring customer data to the People’s Republic of 
China, citing reasons of inadequate protection. See Ken-Ying Tseng & Rebecca Hsiao, Taiwan, in GETTING 
THE DEAL THROUGH: DATA PROTECTION & PRIVACY IN 26 JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE 2014, at 166 (2014), 
available at http://www.leeandli.com/dl.aspx?filecode=1728. 
 154 Phrarāchbaronal trûmkhrxng k̄ĥxmūl s̀̄wn bukhkhl [Personal Data Protection Act] (Tentative Draft, 
2012) (Thai.), translation available at http://media.mofo.com/docs/mofoprivacy/Thai%20data%20protection 
%20bill.doc. 
 155 Id. § 16. 
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Country Regulation Rationale Cited 
Brazil A draft Marco Civil Proposal would have 
permitted the Executive branch to require 
Internet providers to use local structure for 
storage and dissemination of data. 
 
Users’ privacy and 
security, foreign 
surveillance156 
 
Canada 
(British 
Columbia & 
Nova Scotia) 
 
Laws requiring personal information held by 
public bodies to be stored and accessed only 
in Canada unless certain exceptions apply. 
 
Foreign 
surveillance157 
China The People’s Bank of China prohibits 
financial institutions from storing or 
processing personal information relating to 
identity, property, account, credit, and 
financial transactions outside of China. 
 
Users’ privacy and 
security 
 The Information Security Technology 
Guidelines for Personal Information 
Protection within Public and Commercial 
Services Information System (the Guidelines) 
prohibit the transfer of personal data abroad 
without express consent of the data subject or 
explicit regulatory approval. 
Users’ privacy and 
security158 
 The Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Guarding State Secrets prohibits data deemed 
states secrets from being transferred outside of 
China. 
 
National security, 
foreign surveillance 
European 
Union 
The European Union’s 1995 Data Protection 
Directive permits transfer of personal data if 
another jurisdiction provides adequate 
protection, there is a contractual arrangement 
with foreign company or through the Safe 
Harbor. 
 
Users’ privacy and 
security 
 
 156 Statement by Dilma Rousseff, supra note 20. 
 157 CATE, supra note 26. 
 158 See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text. 
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Country Regulation Rationale Cited 
European 
Union 
(continued) 
The proposed General Data Protection 
Regulation permits the transfer of data outside 
European Union if there are appropriate 
safeguards such as binding corporate rules, 
valid European Data Protection Seal for both 
controllers and recipients, standard data 
protection clauses, or contractual clauses 
authorized by a state data protection authority. 
Users’ privacy and 
security 
 
France Proposed to tax the collection, management, 
and commercial exploitation of personal data 
generated by users located in France. 
 
Users’ privacy and 
security; economic 
development159 
 The Military Programming Law permits 
security forces and intelligence services to see 
electronic and digital communications in real 
time. 
 
National security, 
foreign surveillance 
Germany The Conference of German Data Protection 
Commissioners suspended personal 
international data transfer approvals upon 
determining that the Safe Harbor and the 
standard contractual clauses have a 
“substantial likelihood” of violations. 
 
Foreign 
surveillance160 
 Deutsche Telekom proposed that data between 
Germans should be routed inside German 
networks. Chancellor Angela Merkel 
supported this proposal and promoted the 
expansion of the concept to the European 
Union. 
 
Users’ privacy and 
security, foreign 
surveillance161 
India The Information Technology Rules prohibit 
the transfer of “sensitive personal data or 
information” abroad unless the data subject 
consented to the transfer or the transfer is 
“necessary.” 
 
National security 
 
 159 COLLIN & COLIN, supra note 65. 
 160 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 161 See supra notes 77–83. 
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Country Regulation Rationale Cited 
India 
(continued) 
The Public Records Act of 1993 prohibits 
public records from being transferred out of 
Indian territory, except for public purposes. 
The Act barred the transfer of government 
emails outside of India. 
 
National security, 
foreign surveillance 
 The National Security Council proposes 
(1) that email service providers must host 
servers in India, (2) data generated from 
within India must be hosted in India, and 
(3) that mirroring of data to servers abroad is 
prohibited. 
 
National security162 
Indonesia Regulation 82 on the Operation of Electronic 
System and Transaction Operation requires 
public service providers to place data centers 
within the country. 
 
Law enforcement, 
national sovereignty, 
user’s security 
 Draft Regulation on Technical Guidelines on 
Data Center requires any institutions that 
provide information technology-based 
services to build local disaster recovery data 
centers. 
 
Users’ security 
Malaysia The Personal Data Protection Act prohibits 
the transfer of personal data abroad unless 
specified by the Minister or subjected to 
certain exceptions including the consent and 
“necessity” requirements. 
 
Users’ privacy and 
security163  
Nigeria Nigeria National Information Technology 
Development Agency’s Guidelines for 
Nigerian Content Development in Information 
and Communications Technology require ICT 
companies to host all consumer and 
government data locally within the country. 
 
Economic 
development164 
 
 162 See supra notes 100–03 and accompanying text. 
 163 Datuk Seri Dr Rais Yatim, Malaysia’s Information, Communication, and Culture Minister, stated that 
Malaysia enacted the Personal Data Protection Act of 2010 “not only because of rapid commercial 
development involving violations of personal data such as credit status of individuals, but also invasion 
through the means of communication tools being detected and questioned.” Datuk Seri Dr Rais Yatim, 
Protecting Your Personal Data, STAR (May 24, 2013, 10:24:27 PM MYT), http://www.thestar.com.my/ 
News/Nation/2012/02/12/Protecting-your-personal-data/. 
 164 See supra notes 114–18 and accompanying text. 
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Country Regulation Rationale Cited 
Russia Federal Law No. 242 prohibits the storing of 
Russians’ personal data outside of the Russian 
Federation.  
Users’ privacy and 
security, foreign 
surveillance,165 
national security 
 
 Federal Law No. 97 requires individuals and 
legal entities who are information organizers 
on the Internet to store all data for at least six 
months in Russian territory. 
 
Users’ privacy and 
security, foreign 
surveillance, 
national security 
 
 The Ministry of Communications drafted an 
order requiring telecommunications and 
Internet providers to install equipment 
allowing data collection and retention on their 
servers for at least twelve hours. 
 
National security, 
domestic law 
enforcement 
South Korea The Personal Information Protection Act 
requires information processors to inform and 
obtain consent from data subjects for 
transferring personal information to third 
party overseas. 
 
Users’ privacy and 
security 
 The Land Survey, Waterway Survey and 
Cadastral Records Act of 2009—replacing the 
Land Survey Act of 1961—prohibits basic 
land survey and maps information from being 
transferred outside the South Korea without 
authorization of the Minister of Land, 
Transport and Maritime Affairs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National security 
 
 165 See supra notes 122–25 and accompanying text. 
CHANDER_LE GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/19/2015 12:30 PM 
2015] DATA NATIONALISM 713 
Country Regulation Rationale Cited 
Vietnam The Decree on Management, Provision, and 
Use of Internet Services and Information 
Content Online (Decree 72) requires Internet 
service providers to place at least a local 
server inside Vietnamese territory for law 
enforcement purposes.  
Domestic law 
enforcement,166 
users’ privacy and 
security167 
II. ANALYSIS 
The country studies above reveal the pervasive efforts across the world to 
erect barriers to the global Internet. But can these measures that break the 
World Wide Web be justified by important domestic policy rationales? 
Governments offer a variety of arguments for data localization, from avoiding 
foreign surveillance to promoting users’ security and privacy to bolstering 
domestic law enforcement and securing domestic economic development. We 
consider below these four justifications, as well as the costs they will impose 
on the economic development and political and social freedom across the 
world. 
We leave for a later study a crucial additional concern—the fundamental 
tension between data localization and trade liberalization obligations.168 Data 
 
 166 Nguyễn Dũng [Dung Nguyen], Bộ Trưởng Nguyễn Bắc Son: Nghị định 72 Bảo Vệ Lợi Ích Người Dùng 
Internet [Minister Nguyễn Bắc Son: Decree 72 Protects the Interests of Internet Users], INFONET.VN (Aug. 31, 
2013, 06:30), http://infonet.vn/bo-truong-nguyen-bac-son-nghi-dinh-72-bao-ve-loi-ich-nguoi-dung-internet-
post96412.info (Viet.) (Interview with Minister of Information and Communications Nguyen Bac Son: “Nghị 
định 72 là cơ sở pháp lý quan trọng để Bộ TT&TT và các cơ quan chức năng xử lý các trang mạng tự ý khai 
thác, sử dụng thông tin từ các báo mà không được phép, tự ý biên tập làm thay đổi nội dung tác phẩm báo chí. 
Đây là các hành vi vi phạm luật về bản quyền, gây tổn hại về uy tín, hiệu quả hoạt động của các cơ quan báo 
chí.” [“Decree 72 is an important legal instrument for the Ministry of Information and Communications and 
government authorities to manage websites that exploit and use news and information published by news 
agencies without permission and those that independently edit and alter the content of news articles. These are 
activities that infringe copyrights law, damage reputation, and undermine the operation of news agencies.”] 
(translation by author)). 
 167 Id. (“Trước khi có Nghị định 72, các cơ quan chức năng của Việt Nam cũng đã truy tìm ra được những 
thủ phạm đã mạo danh gây tổn hại về uy tín, tài sản của người khác để xử lý theo pháp luật. Nghị định 72 
chính là cơ sở pháp lý bảo đảm cho việc truy tìm và xử lý các hành vi sai phạm trên được thực hiện nhanh 
chóng, thuận lợi và hiệu quả hơn.” [“Before the enactment of Decree 72, Vietnamese authorities already have 
the legal authority to prosecute offenders who, through impersonation or identity theft, harm others’ reputation 
and finance. Decree 72 is the legal instrument to guarantee that wrongdoings can be prosecuted more 
efficiently.”] (translation by author)). 
 168 For important prior work on related issues, see GOOGLE, INC., ENABLING TRADE IN THE ERA OF 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES: BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS TO THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION (2009); 
NAT’L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, PROMOTING CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS: PRIORITIES FOR THE BUSINESS 
COMMUNITY (2013), available at http://www.nftc.org/default/Innovation/PromotingCrossBorderDataFlows 
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localization makes impossible the forms of global business that have appeared 
over the last two decades, allowing the provision of information services 
across borders. Moreover, protectionist policies barring access to foreign 
services only invite reciprocal protectionism from one’s trading partners, 
harming consumers and businesses alike in the process by denying them access 
to the world’s leading services. 
A. Foreign Surveillance 
Beginning on June 5, 2013, the British newspaper The Guardian shocked 
the world with revelations that the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) had 
been secretly intercepting personal data of individuals and dignitaries 
domestically and abroad.169 Through internal records released by Edward 
Snowden, a technical specialist working for the NSA, the NSA was accused of 
monitoring more than thirty-five world leaders170 and intercepting 
communications from more than 50,000 computer systems worldwide.171 
Anger at disclosures of U.S. surveillance abroad has led some countries to 
respond by attempting to keep data from leaving their shores, lest it fall into 
U.S. or other foreign governmental hands. For example, India’s former Deputy 
National Security Advisor, Nehchal Sandhu, reportedly sought ways to route 
domestic Internet traffic via servers within the country, arguing that “[s]uch an 
arrangement would limit the capacity of foreign elements to scrutinize intra-
India traffic.”172 The BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa) are seeking to establish an international network of cables that would 
create “a network free of US eavesdropping.”173 But does data localization in 
 
NFTC.pdf; Joshua Meltzer, Supporting the Internet as a Platform for International Trade Opportunities for 
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises and Developing Countries (Brookings Inst., Working Paper No. 69, 
2014), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2014/02/internet%20 
international%20trade%20meltzer/02%20international%20trade%20version%202.pdf. 
 169 Greenwald, supra note 2; Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User 
Data of Apple, Google and Others, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013, 15.23 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data. For a review of the major revelations, see Ewen MacAskill & 
Gabriel Dance, NSA Files: Decoded, GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
interactive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-files-surveillance-revelations-decoded#section/1. 
 170 James Ball, NSA Monitored Calls of 35 World Leaders After US Official Handed Over Contacts, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 24, 2013, 02.50 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsa-surveillance-
world-leaders-calls. 
 171 Floor Boon, Steven Derix & Huib Modderkolk, NSA Infected 50,000 Computer Networks with 
Malicious Software, NRC.NL (NETH.) (Nov. 23, 2013, 02:40), http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/11/23/nsa-
infected-50000-computer-networks-with-malicious-software/. 
 172 See Thomas, supra note 3.  
 173 Paul Joseph Watson, BRICS Countries Build New Internet to Avoid NSA Spying, INFOWARS.COM (Oct. 
24, 2013), http://www.infowars.com/brics-countries-build-new-internet-to-avoid-nsa-spying/. 
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fact stave off foreign surveillance? There are significant reasons to be skeptical 
of this claim. 
First, the United States, like many countries, concentrates much of its 
surveillance efforts abroad. Indeed, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is 
focused on gathering information overseas, limiting data gathering largely only 
when it implicates U.S. persons.174 The recent NSA surveillance disclosures 
have revealed extensive foreign operations.175 Indeed, constraints on domestic 
operations may well have spurred the NSA to expand operations abroad. As 
the Washington Post reports, “Intercepting communications overseas has clear 
advantages for the NSA, with looser restrictions and less oversight.”176 
Deterred by a 2011 ruling by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
barring certain broad domestic surveillance of Internet and telephone traffic,177 
the NSA may have increasingly turned its attention overseas. 
Second, the use of malware eliminates even the need to have operations on 
the ground in the countries in which surveillance occurs. The Dutch newspaper 
NRC Handelsblad reports that the NSA has infiltrated every corner of the 
world through a network of malicious malware.178 A German computer expert 
noted that “data was intercepted here [by the NSA] on a large scale.”179 The 
NRC Handelsblad suggests that the NSA has even scaled the Great Firewall of 
China,180 demonstrating that efforts to keep information inside a heavily 
secured and monitored ironclad firewall do not necessarily mean that it cannot 
be accessed by those on the other side of the earth. This is a commonplace 
phenomenon on the Internet, of course. The recent enormous security breach of 
millions of Target customers in the United States likely sent credit card data of 
 
 174 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885c (2012). 
 175 Andrea Peterson, The NSA’s Global Spying Operation in One Map, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/09/17/the-nsas-global-spying-operation-in-one-
map/. 
 176 Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google Data Centers Worldwide, 
Snowden Documents Say, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e5 
1d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html. 
 177 FISA Court Ruling on Illegal NSA E-mail Collection Program, WASH. POST, 
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/fisa-court-documents-on-illegal-nsa-e-mail-collection-
program/409/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2015). 
 178 Boon, Derix & Modderkolk, supra note 171.  
 179 Gabriel Borrud, Germany Looks to Erect IT Barrier, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Apr. 11, 2013), 
http://www.dw.de/germany-looks-to-erect-it-barrier/a-17203480. 
 180 Boon, Derix & Modderkolk, supra note 171. 
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Americans to servers in Russia, perhaps through the installation of malware on 
point-of-sale devices in stores.181 
Third, while governments denounce foreign surveillance on behalf of their 
citizens, governments routinely share clandestinely intercepted information 
with each other.182 The Guardian reports that Australia’s intelligence agency 
collects and shares bulk data of Australian nationals with its partners—the 
United States, Britain, Canada, and New Zealand (collectively known as the 
“5-Eyes”).183 Even while the German government has been a forceful critic of 
NSA surveillance, the German intelligence service has been described as a 
“prolific partner” of the NSA.184 Der Spiegel reports that the German foreign 
intelligence agency Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) has been collaborating 
with the NSA, passing about 500 million pieces of metadata in the month of 
December 2012 alone.185 The NSA has collaborated with the effort led by the 
British intelligence agency Government Communications Headquarters 
(GCHQ) to hack into Yahoo!’s webchat service to access unencrypted webcam 
images of millions of users.186 A German computer expert observes, “We 
know now that data was intercepted here on a large scale. So limiting traffic to 
Germany and Europe doesn’t look as promising as the government and 
[Deutsche Telekom] would like you to believe.”187 
Fourth, far from making surveillance more difficult for a foreign 
government, localization requirements might in fact make it easier. By 
compelling companies to use local services rather than global ones, there is a 
greater likelihood of choosing companies with weak security measures. By 
 
 181 See Brian Krebs, Hacker Ring Stole 160 Million Credit Cards, KREBS ON SECURITY (July 13, 2013, 
3:39 PM ET), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/07/hacker-ring-stole-160-million-credit-cards/ (describing 
Russians indicted in the United States for earlier identity theft of Americans). 
 182 See infra note 276 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty 
information sharing procedures. 
 183 Ewan MacAskill, James Ball & Katharine Murphy, Revealed: Australian Spy Agency Offered to Share 
Data About Ordinary Citizens, GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2013, 19:20 EST), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2013/dec/02/revealed-australian-spy-agency-offered-to-share-data-about-ordinary-citizens. 
 184 ‘Prolific Partner’: German Intelligence Used NSA Spy Program, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L, (July 20, 
2013, 6:02 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-intelligence-agencies-used-nsa-spying-
program-a-912173.html. 
 185 Hubert Gude, Laura Poitras & Marcel Rosenbach, Mass Data: Transfers from Germany Aid US 
Surveillance, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L (Aug. 5, 2013, 12:32 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/ 
world/german-intelligence-sends-massive-amounts-of-data-to-the-nsa-a-914821.html. 
 186 Spencer Ackerman & James Ball, Optic Nerve: Millions of Yahoo Webcam Images Intercepted by 
GCHQ, GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, 2014, 05.31 EST), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/27/gchq-nsa-
webcam-images-internet-yahoo. 
 187 Borrud, supra note 179 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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their very nature, the global services are subject to intense worldwide 
competition, while local services—protected by the data localization 
requirements—might have less need to offer stronger security to attract 
customers, and fewer resources to do so, than companies with a global scale. 
Weaker security makes such systems easier targets for foreign surveillance. 
This is what we call the “Protected Local Provider” problem. 
Fifth, data localization might actually facilitate foreign surveillance. 
Centralizing information about users in a locality might actually ease the 
logistical burdens of foreign intelligence agencies, which can now concentrate 
their surveillance of a particular nation’s citizens more easily. We call this the 
“Jackpot” problem. 
Finally, we note that the United States is hardly alone in laws empowering 
authorities to order corporations to share data of private persons. A recent 
study shows that such powers are widespread.188 Indeed, some other states 
permit access to data without requiring a court order.189 That is, one state could 
require a multinational Internet service provider to store all its data on local 
servers, but that fact does not bar another state from requiring the same 
multinational provider to turn over data on those servers. 
One data localization measure—South Korea’s requirement that mapping 
data be stored in the country—seems especially difficult to defend. After all, 
under the rules, one can access South Korean maps from abroad freely, as long 
 
 188 See WINSTON MAXWELL & CHRISTOPHER WOLF, HOGAN LOVELLS, A GLOBAL REALITY: 
GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO DATA IN THE CLOUD 3 (rev. ed. 2012), available at 
http://www.hldataprotection.com/uploads/file/Revised%20Government%20Access%20to%20Cloud%20Data
%20Paper%20(18%20July%2012).pdf [hereinafter HOGAN LOVELLS WHITE PAPER]. 
 189 In France, the government can obtain data directly from ISPs without a court order. Loi No. 2006-64 
du 23 janvier 2006 relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme et portant dispositions diverses relatives à la sécurité 
et aux contrôles frontaliers [Law 2006-64 of January 23, 2006, Anti-Terror Act], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA 
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 24, 2006, p. 19 (Fr.), available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006053177. Under Germany’s 
Telecommunications Act, the government has a right to request data stored by telecommunications companies 
to advance certain prosecutorial and protective functions. Telekommunikationsgesetz [TKG] 
[Telecommunications Act] June 22, 2004, BGBL. I at 1190, § 112 (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/tkg_2004/index.html, translation available at, http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/Gesetz/ 
telekommunkationsgesetz-en,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf. A member of the 
Irish Garda Síochána not below the rank of chief superintendent may request a service provider to disclose to 
that member data retained by the service provider under certain conditions. Communications (Retention of 
Data) Act (Act No. 3/2011), § 6 (Ir.), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2011/en/act/pub/0003/ 
print.html. 
CHANDER_LE GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/19/2015 12:30 PM 
718 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:677 
as services are themselves based in South Korea.190 Thus, if a foreigner wants 
to access online maps of South Korea, it simply needs to turn to Naver and 
Daum, services that use servers located in that country.191 As Yonsei 
University Business School Professor Ho Geun Lee stated, should North Korea 
want, it can use Naver and Daum’s services to view street maps and 
photographs of streets.192 
In sum, as Emma Llansó of the U.S.-based Center for Technology and 
Democracy warns with respect to Brazil’s attempt to block information from 
leaving that country, data localization “would not necessarily keep Brazilians’ 
data out of the NSA’s hands.”193 One security professional observes, “The only 
way to really make anything that is NSA proof is to not have it connect to the 
Internet.”194 
B. Privacy and Security 
Closely related to the goal of avoiding foreign surveillance through data 
localization is the goal of protecting the privacy and security of personal 
information against nongovernmental criminal activities. As the country 
studies above show, the laws of many countries make it difficult to transfer 
personal data outside of national borders in the name of privacy and security. 
While these laws are not explicitly designed to localize data, by creating 
significant barriers to the export of data, they operate as data localization 
measures. 
 
 190 A user in the United States can access maps of South Korea via either Naver or Daum. See supra notes 
132–36 and accompanying text. 
 191 Additionally, one might note that sensitive locations such as the Blue House (the President’s 
residence) or military compounds can be removed from foreign services, as well as domestic ones, at the 
request of the South Korean government. Lan Goh, ‘Jido, Haeoe Ban Chul Hamyeon Cheobeol’ 50nyeon Jeon 
Gasie Changjog Hyeongje Balmok [Punishment Imposed if Map Data is Exported Overseas, “Creative 
Economy” Impeded by 50-year-old Thorn], JOONGANG ILBO (S. Kor.) (Aug. 20, 2013), 
http://article.joins.com/news/article/article.asp?total_id=12380240&cloc=olink|article|default (noting that 
sensitive information is already excluded after examination by government officials). 
 192 Ho Geun Lee, Jido Deiteo, Ijen Segyewa Gyeongjaeng Haja [Map Data, Let’s Compete with the 
World], DIGITAL TIMES (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.dt.co.kr/contents.html?article_no=2013092702012 
351607001 (S. Kor.). 
 193 Emma Llansó, Momentum Builds for Brazil’s Internet Rights Law, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. 
(Sept. 27, 2013), https://cdt.org/blog/momentum-builds-for-brazil%E2%80%99s-internet-rights-law/. 
 194 Jon Swartz, NSA Surveillance Hurting Tech Firms’ Business, USA TODAY, Feb. 28, 2014, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/02/27/nsa-resistant-products-obama-tech-companies-encryption-
overseas/5290553/ (internal quotation marks omitted). 
CHANDER_LE GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/19/2015 12:30 PM 
2015] DATA NATIONALISM 719 
The irony is that such efforts are likely to undermine, not strengthen, the 
privacy and security of the information.195 First, localized data servers reduce 
the opportunity to distribute information across multiple servers in different 
locations. As we have noted above, the information gathered together in one 
place offers a tempting jackpot, an ideal target for criminals. As some 
computer experts have noted, “Requirements to localize data . . . only make it 
impossible for cloud service providers to take advantage of the Internet’s 
distributed infrastructure and use sharding and obfuscation on a global 
scale.”196 Sharding is the process in which rows of a database table are held 
separately in servers across the world—making each partition a “shard” that 
provides enough data for operation but not enough to re-identify an 
individual.197 “The correct solution,” Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director with 
India’s Centre for Internet and Society suggests, “would be to encourage the 
creation and use of de-centralised and end-to-end encrypted services that do 
not store all your data in one place.”198 
Second, as we noted above, the Protected Local Provider offering storage 
and processing services may be more likely to have weak security 
infrastructure than companies that continuously improve their security to 
respond to the ever-growing sophistication of cyberthieves. As a recent cover 
feature of the IEEE Computer Society magazine observes, “The most common 
threats to data in the cloud involve breaches by hackers against inadequately 
protected systems, user carelessness or lack of caution, and engineering 
errors.”199 Information technology associations from Europe, Japan, and the 
United States have echoed this observation, arguing that “security is a function 
of how a product is made, used, and maintained, not by whom or where it is 
made.”200 When Australia was contemplating a rule requiring health data to 
 
 195 Daniel Castro, The False Promise of Data Nationalism, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. 1 (Dec. 
2013), http://www2.itif.org/2013-false-promise-data-nationalism.pdf (“The notion that data must be stored 
domestically to ensure that it remains secure and private is false.”).  
 196 Patrick S. Ryan, Sarah Falvey & Ronak Merchant, When the Cloud Goes Local: The Global Problem 
with Data Localization, COMPUTER, Dec. 2013, at 54, 56. 
 197 David Geer, Big Data Security, Privacy Concerns Remain Unanswered, COMPUTERWORLD (Dec. 5, 
2013, 22:43), http://news.idg.no/cw/art.cfm?id=B1920F48-0FD6-A5E7-5685FC364B81ECBB. 
 198 Rohin Dharmakumar, India’s Internet Privacy Woes, FORBES INDIA (Aug. 26, 2013), 
http://forbesindia.com/article/checkin/indias-internet-privacywoes/35971/1#ixzz2r0zriZTF. 
 199 Ryan, Falvey & Merchant, supra note 196, at 56. 
 200 Statement, Digital Eur., U.S. Info. Tech. Indus. Council (ITI) & Japan Elecs. & Info. Tech. Indus. 
Assoc. (JEITA), Global Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Industry Statement: 
Recommended Government Approaches to Cybersecurity (June 2012), available at 
http://www.jeita.or.jp/english/topics/2012/0622/release_2012_en.pdf. This idea is echoed in submissions from 
a range of IT consortia. 
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remain in the country (a rule that was subsequently implemented), Microsoft 
made a similar argument. Microsoft argued that the rule might undermine the 
security of Australian health information by limiting consumer choice among 
potential providers and wrote, “Consumers should have the ability to 
personally control their [personal electronic health records] by choosing to 
have their [personal electronic health records] held by an entity not located 
within Australia’s territorial boundaries if they believe that entity can provide 
to them a service that meets their individual needs.”201 
Indeed, countries pushing for data localization themselves are sometimes 
hotbeds of cybercrimes. According to experts, “Cyber security is notoriously 
weak in Indonesia.”202 Indeed, the nation has been called a “hacker’s 
paradise.”203 One 2013 report on Vietnam suggests that “2,045 agency and 
business websites were hacked this year, but the number of cyber security 
experts was too small to cope with all of them.”204 Another account suggests 
that “Brazil is among the main targets of virtual threats such as malware and 
phishing.”205 For example, in 2011, hackers stole one billion dollars from 
companies in Brazil, as Forbes put it, the “worst prepared nation to adopt 
cloud technology.”206 At times, a cybertheft can begin with a domestic 
burglary, as in the case of one recent European episode.207 Or cyberthefts can 
 
 201 MICROSOFT, PERSONALLY CONTROLLED ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS BILL 2011 – EXPOSURE 
DRAFT (Oct. 28, 2011) (on file with Emory Law Journal); see also Richard Chirgwin, Microsoft to Aussie 
Gov: Privacy Rules Stifle e-Health, REGISTER (Nov. 25, 2011, 00:01), http://www.theregister.co.uk/ 
2011/11/25/ms_threatens_au_gov_over_ehealth/. An Australian local healthcare provider worried about an 
additional problem with the rule: the proliferation of mobile devices among Australians would inevitably result 
in information being held overseas as the Australians took these devices abroad; the provider observed, 
“Consumers will access their data via mobile devices overseas and this will result in data, de facto, being 
accessed and potentially held or cached, outside of Australia.” CSC, supra note 15; see also Taylor, supra note 
15 (examining CSC’s submission to Parliament). 
 202 Jonathan Vit, Hacker’s Paradise or Host Nation? Indonesian Officials Weigh Cyber Threat, 
JAKARTAGLOBE (Oct. 25, 2013, 6:34 PM), http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/hackers-paradise-or-host-
nation-indonesian-officials-weigh-cyber-threat/. 
 203 Id. 
 204 VN at Risk over Lack of Cyber-Security, VIỆT NAM NEWS (Oct. 30, 2013, 08:42:00), 
http://vietnamnews.vn/economy/246923/vn-at-risk-over-lack-of-cyber-security.html. 
 205 FROST & SULLIVAN, DOING BUSINESS IN BRAZIL: HOW TO REDUCE YOUR RISKS THROUGH IT 
INFRASTRUCTURE OUTSOURCING 7 (2012), available at http://www.alog.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2012/ 
12/Brazilian_IT_Infrastructure.pdf (emphasis omitted). 
 206 Ricardo Geromel, Hackers Stole $1 Billion in Brazil, The Worst Prepared Nation to Adopt Cloud 
Technology, FORBES (Mar. 2, 2012, 8:45 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ricardogeromel/2012/03/02/ 
hackers-stole-1billion-in-brazil-the-worst-prepared-nation-to-adopt-cloud-technology/. 
 207 See Christopher Thompson, Caroline Binham & Jonathan Guthrie, ENRC Warns Hackers May Have 
Stolen Sensitive Data, FIN. TIMES, May 23, 2013, at 16, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e25863cc-
c392-11e2-8c30-00144feab7de.html. 
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be accomplished with a USB “thumb” drive. In January 2014, information 
about more than 100 million South Korean credit cards was stolen, likely 
through an “inside job” by a contractor armed with a USB drive.208 
Most fundamentally, there is little reason to believe that the personal 
information of British Columbians is more secure just because it is stored on a 
government computer in Vancouver than one owned by IBM, a few miles 
further south. 
C. Economic Development 
Many governments believe that by forcing companies to localize data 
within national borders, they will increase investment at home. Thus, data 
localization measures are often motivated, whether explicitly or not, by desires 
to promote local economic development. In fact, however, data localization 
raises costs for local businesses, reduces access to global services for 
consumers, hampers local start-ups, and interferes with the use of the latest 
technological advances. 
In an Information Age, the global flow of data has become the lifeblood of 
economies across the world. While some in Europe have raised concerns about 
the transfer of data abroad, the European Commission has recognized “the 
critical importance of data flows notably for the transatlantic economy.”209 The 
Commission observes that international data transfers “form an integral part of 
commercial exchanges across the Atlantic including for new growing digital 
businesses, such as social media or cloud computing, with large amounts of 
data going from the EU to the US.”210 Worried about the effect of constraints 
on data flows on both global information sharing and economic development, 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has 
urged nations to avoid “barriers to the location, access and use of cross-border 
 
 208 Choe Sang-Hun, Theft of Data Fuels Worries in South Korea, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/21/business/international/theft-of-data-fuels-worries-in-south-korea.html; 
Joyce Lee, South Koreans Seethe, Sue as Credit Card Details Swiped, REUTERS, Jan. 21, 2014, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/21/us-korea-cards-idUSBREA0K05120140121. 
 209 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Functioning 
of the Safe Harbour from the Perspective of EU Citizens and Companies Established in the EU, at 3, COM 
(2013) 847 final (Nov. 27, 2013), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/com_ 
2013_847_en.pdf. 
 210 Rebuilding Trust in EU-US Data Flows, supra note 54, at 2. 
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data facilities and functions” when consistent with other fundamental rights, in 
order to “ensure cost effectiveness and other efficiencies.”211 
The worry about the impact of data localization is widely shared in the 
business community as well. The value of the Internet to national economies 
has been widely noted.212 Regarding Brazil’s attempt to require data 
localization, the Information Technology Industry Council, an industry 
association representing more than forty major Internet companies, had argued 
that “in-country data storage requirements would detrimentally impact all 
economic activity that depends on data flows.”213 The Swedish government 
agency, the National Board of Trade, recently interviewed fifteen local 
companies of various sizes across sectors and concluded succinctly that “trade 
cannot happen without data being moved from one location to another.”214 
Data localization, like most protectionist measures, leads only to small 
gains for a few local enterprises and workers, while causing significant harms 
spread across the entire economy. The domestic benefits of data localization go 
to the few owners and employees of data centers and the few companies 
servicing these centers locally. Meanwhile, the harms of data localization are 
widespread, felt by small, medium, and large businesses that are denied access 
to global services that might improve productivity. In response to Russia’s 
recently passed localization law, the NGO Russian Association for Electronic 
Communications stressed the potential economic consequences, pointing to the 
withdrawal of global services and substantial economic losses caused by the 
passing of similar laws in other countries.215 For example, besides the loss of 
international social media platforms, localization would make it impossible for 
 
 211 ORG. FOR ECO. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION ON PRINCIPLES FOR 
INTERNET POLICY-MAKING 7 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/49258588.pdf. 
 212 For more information on the economic impact of the Internet and related technologies, see studies 
compiled by VALUE OF THE WEB, http://www.valueoftheweb.com/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2015). 
 213 Letter from Info. Tech. Indus. Council Brazil, to Members of the Brazilian Nat’l Congress (Oct. 22, 
2013), available at https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/files/2013/11/Brazil-Data-Localization-Letter-
English-Version-for-distribution.pdf. Internet companies in Brazil have largely supported the Marco Civil, 
with the significant exception of this particular provision. For a list of members, see Member Companies, 
INFO. TECH. INDUS. COUNCIL, http://www.itic.org/about/member-companies.dot (last visited Feb. 6, 2015). 
 214 KOMMERSKOLLEGIUM [SWED. NAT’L BD. OF TRADE], NO TRANSFER, NO TRADE: THE IMPORTANCE OF 
CROSS-BORDER DATA TRANSFER FOR COMPANIES BASED IN SWEDEN 23 (2014), available at 
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 215 The Russian Association for Electronic Communications stated, “Passing similar laws on the 
localization of personal data in other countries has led to withdrawal of global services and substantial 
economic losses.” New Russian Law Bans Citizens’ Personal Data Being Held on Foreign Servers, RT (July 
5, 2014, 10:50), http://rt.com/politics/170604-russia-personal-data-servers/ (emphasis omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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Russians to order airline tickets or consumer goods through online services. 
Localization requirements also seriously affect Russian companies like 
Aeroflot because the airline depends on foreign ticket-booking systems.216 
Critics worried, at the time, that the Brazilian data localization requirement 
would “deny[] Brazilian users access to great services that are provided by US 
and other international companies.”217 Marilia Marciel, a digital policy expert 
at Fundação Getulio Vargas in Rio de Janeiro, observes, “Even Brazilian 
companies prefer to host their data outside of Brazil.”218 Data localization 
affects domestic innovation by denying entrepreneurs the ability to build on 
top of global services based abroad. Brasscom, the Brazilian Association of 
Information Technology and Communication Companies, argues that such 
obligations would “hurt[] the country’s ability to create, innovate, create jobs 
and collect taxes from the proper use of the Internet.”219 
Governments implementing in-country data mandates imagine that the 
various global services used in their country will now build infrastructure 
locally. Many services, however, will find it uneconomical and even too risky 
to establish local servers in certain territories.220 Data centers are expensive, all 
the more so if they have the highest levels of security. One study finds Brazil 
to be the most expensive country in the Western hemisphere in which to build 
data centers.221 Building a data center in Brazil costs $60.9 million on average, 
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17:18 PST), http://www.zdnet.com/new-data-storage-demands-may-put-companies-off-brazil-7000022790/ 
(internal quotations marks omitted).  
 220 See CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD, DATA CENTRE RISK INDEX (2013), http://www.cushmanwakefield.com/ 
~/media/global-reports/data-centre-risk-index-2013.pdf. 
 221 FROST & SULLIVAN, supra note 205, at 10; see also Israel & Soto, supra note 218. Brazil has 
attempted to address the cost barrier for building local data centers through tax incentives, as part of a 
broadband infrastructure program, the Regime Especial de Tributação do Programa Nacional de Banda Larga 
(Special Taxation Regime for the Broadband National Program). See Decreto No. 7.921, de 18 de Fevereiro de 
2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.], de 18.02.2013 (Braz.), available at http://www.jusbrasil.com.br/ 
diarios/50903713/dou-secao-1-18-02-2013-pg-2; Brazil Signs Tax Relief Measure for Telecom Network 
Construction, RCR WIRELESS NEWS (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.rcrwireless.com/americas/20130219/ 
spectrum/brazils-government-signs-decree-relieve-tax-construction-new-telecom-networks/. 
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while building one in Chile and the United States costs $51.2 million and $43 
million, respectively.222 Operating such a data center remains expensive 
because of enormous energy and other expenses—averaging $950,000 in 
Brazil, $710,000 in Chile, and $510,000 in the United States each month.223 
This cost discrepancy is mostly due to high electricity costs and heavy import 
taxes on the equipment needed for the center.224 Data centers employ few 
workers, with energy making up three-quarters of the costs of operations.225 
According to the 2013 Data Centre Risk Index—a study of thirty countries on 
the risks affecting successful data center operations—Australia, Russia, China, 
Indonesia, India, and Brazil are among the riskiest countries for running data 
centers.226 
Not only are there significant economic costs to data localization, the 
potential gains are more limited than governments imagine. Data server farms 
are hardly significant generators of employment, populated instead by 
thousands of computers and few human beings. The significant initial outlay 
they require is largely in capital goods, the bulk of which is often imported into 
a country. The diesel generators, cooling systems, servers, and power supply 
devices tend to be imported from global suppliers.227 Ironically, it is often 
American suppliers of servers and other hardware that stand to be the 
beneficiaries of data localization mandates.228 One study notes, “Brazilian 
suppliers of components did not benefit from this [data localization 
requirement], since the imported products dominate the market.”229 By 
increasing capital purchases from abroad, data localization requirements can in 
fact increase merchandise trade deficits. Furthermore, large data farms are 
 
 222 Loretta Chao & Paulo Trevisani, Brazil Legislators Bear Down on Internet Bill, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 13, 
2013, 6:45 PM ET), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304868404579194290325348688 
(according to a government-commissioned study seen by The Wall Street Journal). 
 223 Id. 
 224 See FROST & SULLIVAN, supra note 205, at 10; Israel & Soto, supra note 218. 
 225 See RACHEL A. DINES, FORRESTER RESEARCH, INC., BUILD OR BUY? THE ECONOMICS OF DATA 
CENTER FACILITIES (2011), available at https://www.forrester.com/Build+Or+Buy+The+Economics+ 
Of+Data+Center+Facilities/-/E-WEB7855. 
 226 CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD, supra note 220, at 7. 
 227 FROST & SULLIVAN, supra note 205, at 10. 
 228 Press Release, Gartner, Gartner Says Worldwide Server Shipments Market Grew 1.3 Percent in the 
Second Quarter of 2014 While Revenue Increased 2.8 Percent (Aug. 27, 2014), available at 
http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2833020 (noting that US multinational HP, IBM, Dell, Oracle, and 
Cisco together make up about 76.4 percent of the server market share during the second quarter of 2014). 
 229 Brazil Data Center Power Supplies Market Size Report by Frost & Sullivan, INFOTECH LEAD (Dec. 12, 
2013), http://infotechlead.com/2013/12/12/brazil-data-center-power-supplies-market-size-report-frost-
sullivan/. 
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enormous consumers of energy,230 and thus often further burden overtaxed 
energy grids. They thereby harm other industries that must now compete for 
this energy, paying higher prices while potentially suffering limitations in 
supply of already scarce power. 
Cost, as well as access to the latest innovations, drives many e-commerce 
enterprises in Indonesia to use foreign data centers. Daniel Tumiwa, head of 
the Indonesian E-Commerce Association (IdEA), states that “[t]he cost can 
double easily in Indonesia.”231 Indonesia’s Internet start-ups have accordingly 
often turned to foreign countries such as Australia, Singapore, or the United 
States to host their services. One report suggests that “many of the ‘tools’ that 
start-up online media have relied on elsewhere are not fully available yet in 
Indonesia.”232 The same report also suggests that a weak local hosting 
infrastructure in Indonesia means that sites hosted locally experience delayed 
loading time.233 Similarly, as the Vietnamese government attempts to foster 
entrepreneurship and innovation,234 localization requirements effectively bar 
start-ups from utilizing cheap and powerful platforms abroad and potentially 
handicap Vietnam from “join[ing] in the technology race.”235 
Governments worried about transferring data abroad at the same time hope, 
somewhat contradictorily, to bring foreign data within their borders. Many 
countries seek to become leaders in providing data centers for companies 
operating across their regions. In 2010, Malaysia announced its Economic 
Transformation Program236 to transform Malaysia into a world-class data 
 
 230 In 2013, datacenters in the United States consumed the equivalent of 34 large (500-megwatt) coal-fired 
power plants total annual output. NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, DATA CENTER EFFICIENCY ASSESSMENT 5 
(2014), http://www.nrdc.org/energy/files/data-center-efficiency-assessment-IP.pdf. 
 231 Avi Tejo Bhaskoro, Indonesia Ministry Still Insists on Local Data Centers for Online Companies, 
DAILYSOCIAL (May 8, 2013, 16:28:27), http://en.dailysocial.net/post/indonesian-ministry-still-insists-on-local-
data-centers-for-online-companies (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 232 Ross Settles, Indonesia: A Hotbed of Innovative Online Publishing Start-ups, CLICKZ (Mar. 30, 2011), 
http://www.clickz.com/clickz/column/2281593/indonesia-a-hotbed-of-innovative-online-publishing-startups. 
 233 See id. 
 234 On June 4, 2013, the Ministry of Science and Technology launched the Silicon Valley Project to 
stimulate the growth of technology startups in Vietnam. See VIETNAM SILICON VALLEY PROJECT, 
http://www.siliconvalley.com.vn/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2015). 
 235 See Elisabeth Rosen, Can Vietnam Create the Next Silicon Valley, ATLANTIC (Feb. 11, 2014, 5:43 PM 
ET), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/02/can-vietnam-create-the-next-silicon-valley/ 
283760/. 
 236 Overview of ETP, ECON. TRANSFORMATION PROGRAMME, http://etp.pemandu.gov.my/About_ETP-@-
Overview_of_ETP.aspx (last visited Feb. 6, 2015).  
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center hub for the Asia-Pacific region.237 Brazil hopes to accomplish the same 
for Latin America, while France seeks to stimulate its economy via a “Made in 
France” digital industry.238 Instead of spurring local investment, data 
localization can lead to the loss of investment. First, there’s the retaliation 
effect. Would countries send data to Brazil if Brazil declares that data is unsafe 
if sent abroad? Brasscom notes that the Brazilian Internet industry’s growth 
would be hampered if other countries engage in similar reactive policies, 
which “can stimulate the migration of datacenters based here, or at least part of 
them, to other countries.”239 Some in the European Union sympathize with this 
concern. European Commissioner for the Digital Agenda, Neelie Kroes, has 
expressed similar doubts, worrying about the results for European global 
competitiveness if each country has its own separate Internet.240 Then there’s 
the avoidance effect. Rio de Janeiro State University Law Professor Ronaldo 
Lemos, who helped write the original Marco Civil and is currently Director of 
the Rio Institute for Technology and Society, warns that the localization 
provision would have caused foreign companies to avoid the country 
altogether: “It could end up having the opposite effect to what is intended, and 
scare away companies that want to do business in Brazil.”241 Indeed, such 
burdensome local laws often lead companies to launch overseas, in order to try 
to avoid these rules entirely. Foreign companies, too, might well steer clear of 
the country in order to avoid entanglement with cumbersome rules. For 
example, Yahoo!, while very popular in Vietnam, places its servers for the 
 
 237 EPP 3: Positioning Malaysia as a World-class Data Centre Hub, ECON. TRANSFORMATION 
PROGRAMME, http://etp.pemandu.gov.my/Business_Services-@-Business_Services_-_EPP_3-;_Positioning_ 
Malaysia_As_A_World-class_Data_Centre_Hub.aspx (last visited Feb. 6, 2015); see also Edwin Yapp, 
Malaysia’s Data Center Ambition Faces Challenges, ZDNET (Apr. 28, 2011, 10:40 GMT), 
http://www.zdnet.com/malaysias-data-center-ambition-faces-challenges-2062208606/ (“Malaysia has the 
geographical stability to meet this [growing cloud computing] need.”); Edwin Yapp, Malaysia Must Fulfil 
Promises to Boost ICT, ZDNET (Oct. 18, 2010, 10:20 GMT), http://www.zdnet.com/malaysia-must-fulfil-
promises-to-boost-ict-2062203784/. 
 238 See NEW FACE OF INDUSTRY, supra note 63, at 1; Press Release, Invest in Fr. Agency, The Growing 
Market for Cloud Computing in France (Jan. 2012), available at http://www.invest-in-
france.org/Medias/Publications/1588/cloud-computing-in-France-January-2012.pdf. 
 239 Mari, supra note 219 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 240 See Chiponda Chimbelu, No Welcome for Deutsche Telekom National Internet Plans from EU 
Commission, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.dw.de/no-welcome-for-deutsche-telekom-
national-internet-plans-from-eu-commission/a-17219111. 
 241 Israel & Soto, supra note 218 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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country in Singapore.242 In these ways we see that data localization mandates 
can backfire entirely, leading to avoidance instead of investment. 
Data localization requirements place burdens on domestic enterprises not 
faced by those operating in more liberal jurisdictions. Countries that require 
data to be cordoned off complicate matters for their own enterprises, which 
must turn to domestic services if they are to comply with the law. Such 
companies must also develop mechanisms to segregate the data they hold by 
the nationality of the data subject. The limitations may impede development of 
new, global services. Critics argue that South Korea’s ban on the export of 
mapping data, for example, impedes the development of next-generation 
services in Korea: Technology services, such as Google Glass, driverless cars, 
and information programs for visually-impaired users, are unlikely to develop 
and grow in Korea. Laws made in the 1960s are preventing many venture 
enterprises from advancing to foreign markets via location/navigation 
services.243 
The harms of data localization for local businesses are not restricted to 
Internet enterprises or to consumers denied access to global services. As it 
turns out, most of the economic benefits from Internet technologies accrue to 
traditional businesses. A McKinsey study estimates that about seventy-five 
percent of the value added created by the Internet and data flow is in traditional 
industries, in part through increases in productivity.244 The potential economic 
impact across the major sectors—healthcare, manufacturing, electricity, urban 
infra-structure, security, agriculture, retail, etc.—is estimated at $2.7 to 
$6.2 trillion per year.245 This is particularly important for emerging economies, 
in which traditional industries remain predominant. The Internet raises profits 
as well, due to increased revenues, lower costs of goods sold, and lower 
administrative costs.246 With data localization mandates, traditional businesses 
 
 242 Thu Huong, VN Digital Content Firms Find Home Disadvantage, VIỆT NAM NEWS (Sept. 22, 2008), 
http://vietnamnews.vn/economy/business-beat/180617/vn-digital-content-firms-find-home-disadvantage.html 
(noting that Yahoo!’s servers serving Vietnam are based in Singapore). 
 243 See supra notes 132–36 and accompanying text. 
 244 MATTHIEU PÉLISSIÉ DU RAUSAS ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., INTERNET MATTERS: THE NET’S 
SWEEPING IMPACT ON GROWTH, JOBS, AND PROSPERITY 22 (2011), available at 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/high_tech_telecoms_internet/internet_matters. 
 245 JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: ADVANCES THAT 
WILL TRANSFORM LIFE, BUSINESS, AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 55 (2013), available at 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/disruptive_technologies. 
 246 See PÉLISSIÉ DU RAUSAS ET AL., supra note 244, at 17. 
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will lose access to the many global services that would store or process 
information offshore. 
Data localization requirements also interfere with the most important trends 
in computing today. They limit access to the disruptive technologies of the 
future, such as cloud computing, the “Internet of Things,” and data-driven 
innovations (especially those relying on “big data”). Data localization 
sacrifices the innovations made possible by building on top of global Internet 
platforms based on cloud computing. This is particularly important for 
entrepreneurs operating in emerging economies that might lack the 
infrastructure already developed elsewhere. And it places great impediments to 
the development of both the Internet of Things and big data analytics, requiring 
costly separation of data by political boundaries and often denying the 
possibility of aggregating data across borders. We discuss the impacts on these 
trends below. 
Cloud Computing. Data localization requirements will often prevent access 
to global cloud computing services. As we have indicated, while governments 
assume that global services will simply erect local data server farms, such 
hopes are likely to prove unwarranted. Thus, local companies will be denied 
access to the many companies that might help them scale up, or to go global.247 
Many companies around the world are built on top of existing global services. 
Highly successful companies with Indian origins such as Slideshare and Zoho 
relied on global services such as Amazon Web Services and Google Apps.248 A 
Slideshare employee cites the scalability made possible by the use of 
Amazon’s cloud services, noting, “Sometimes I need 100 servers, sometimes I 
only need 10.”249 A company like Zoho can use Google Apps, while at the 
same time competing with Google in higher value-added services.250 
 
 247 Whether the transfer of information to a cloud service hosted abroad triggers a local privacy law 
obligation will depend on how the law is interpreted. One report suggests that in Australia, “under the 
[infrastructure as a service] model . . . the data is not usually ‘transferred’ to a third party (ie [sic] the 
vendor),” and thus does not trigger a data transfer obligation, while the software as a service model (SaaS) 
might well trigger such an obligation. ALEC CHRISTIE, DLA PIPER CLOUD COMPUTING AND THE NEW 
AUSTRALIAN PRIVACY LAW (2013), http://www.dlapiper.com/files/Publication/3ecfb49d-c14a-4fab-9645-
44d61829f2b1/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/21860e03-439b-43a2-9a44-45746fdd65e1/Cloud%20 
Computing%20and%20the%20new%20Australian%20Privacy%20Law.pdf. 
 248 JONATHAN BOUTELLE, SLIDESHARE, HOW SLIDESHARE USES AMAZON WEB SERVICES (2010), 
available at http://www.slideshare.net/jboutelle/slideshare-aws-talk; Alex Williams, Zoho Integrates Google 
Apps and Keeps Step with the Giants, READWRITE (Dec. 2, 2009), http://readwrite.com/2009/12/01/ 
zoho#awesm=~otx2zoOOYtio6Y. 
 249 Boutelle, supra note 248, at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 250 Williams, supra note 248. 
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Accessing such global services thus allows a small company to maintain a 
global presence without having to deploy the vast infrastructure that would be 
necessary to scale as needed. 
The Internet of Things. As the world shifts to Internet-connected devices, 
data localization will require data flows to be staunched at national borders, 
requiring expensive and cumbersome national infrastructures for such devices. 
This erodes the promise of the Internet of Things—where everyday objects and 
our physical surroundings are Internet-enabled and connected—for both 
consumers and businesses. Consumer devices include wearable technologies 
that “measure some sort of detail about you, and log it.”251 Devices such as 
Sony’s Smartband allied with a Lifelog application to track and analyze both 
physical movements and social interactions252 or the Fitbit253 device from an 
innovative start-up suggest the revolutionary possibilities for both large and 
small manufacturers. The connected home and wearable computing devices are 
becoming increasingly important consumer items.254 A heart monitoring 
system collects data from patients and physicians around the world and uses 
the anonymized data to advance cardiac care.255 Such devices collect data for 
analysis typically on the company’s own or outsourced computer servers, 
which could be located anywhere across the world. Over this coming decade, 
the Internet of Things is estimated to generate $14.4 trillion in value that is “up 
for grabs” for global enterprises.256 Companies are also adding Internet sensors 
not just to consumer products but to their own equipment and facilities around 
the world through RFID tags or through other devices. The oil industry has 
embraced what has come to be known as the “digital oil field,” where real-time 
 
 251 Samuel Gibbs & Charles Arthur, CES 2014: Why Wearable Technology is the New Dress Code, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 7, 2014, 03.29 EST), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jan/08/wearable-
technology-consumer-electronics-show.  
 252 Lifelog, SONY, http://www.sonymobile.com/global-en/apps-services/lifelog/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2015). 
 253 Who We Are, FITBIT, http://www.fitbit.com/about (last visited Feb. 6, 2015). 
 254 See Dan Rowinski, CES 2014: Connected Homes and Wearables to Take Center Stage, READWRITE 
(Jan. 3, 2014), http://readwrite.com/2014/01/03/ces-2014-preview-wearable-technology-4k-tv-connected-
home-smartphones-tablets. 
 255 See Why Use It, ALIVECOR, http://www.alivecor.com/why-use-it (last visited Feb. 6, 2015). 
 256 JOSEPH BRADLEY, JOEL BARBIER & DOUG HANDLER, CISCO, EMBRACING THE INTERNET OF 
EVERYTHING TO CAPTURE YOUR SHARE OF $14.4 TRILLION 3 (2013), http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ 
ac79/docs/innov/IoE_Economy.pdf. This is the reported “Value at Stake—the combination of increased 
revenues and lower costs that is created or will migrate among companies and industries from 2013 to 2022.” 
Id. at 1.  
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data is collected and analyzed remotely.257 While data about oil flows would 
hardly constitute personal information, such data might be controlled under 
laws protecting sensitive national security information. The Internet of Things 
shows the risks of data localization for consumers, who may be denied access 
to many of the best services the world has to offer. It also shows the risk of 
data localization for companies seeking to better monitor their systems around 
the world. 
Data Driven Innovation (Big Data). Many analysts believe that data-driven 
innovations will be a key basis of competition, innovation, and productivity in 
the years to come, though many note the importance of protecting privacy in 
the process of assembling ever-larger databases.258 McKinsey even reclassifies 
data as a new kind of factor of production for the Information Age.259 Data 
localization threatens big data in at least two ways. First, by limiting data 
aggregation by country, it increases costs and adds complexity to the collection 
and maintenance of data. Second, data localization requirements can reduce the 
size of potential data sets, eroding the informational value that can be gained 
by cross-jurisdictional studies. Large-scale, global experiments technically 
possible through big data analytics, especially on the web, may have to give 
way to narrower, localized studies. Perhaps anonymization will suffice to 
comport with data localization laws and thus still permit cross-border data 
flow, but this will depend on the specifics of the law. 
D. Domestic Law Enforcement 
Governments have an obligation to protect their citizens, including both 
preventing harms and punishing those who have committed crimes. 
Widespread fear of terrorist attacks in particular has led some countries to 
widen surveillance efforts. The United States expanded its surveillance 
authority in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks with the USA PATRIOT 
Act260 and then subsequently with other measures such as the Foreign 
 
 257 Jessica Leber, Big Oil Goes Mining for Big Data, MIT TECH. REV. (May 8, 2012), 
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/427876/big-oil-goes-mining-for-big-data/ (“At Chevron, it’s the 
‘i-field.’ BP has the ‘Field of the Future,’ and Royal Dutch Shell likes ‘Smart Fields.’”). 
 258 JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., BIG DATA: THE NEXT FRONTIER FOR INNOVATION, 
COMPETITION, AND PRODUCTIVITY 13 (2011), http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/big_ 
data_the_next_frontier_for_innovation. 
 259 Id. at 3. 
 260 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. II, 115 Stat. 272, 278–96 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). Sections 202 and 217 of the Act clarify that law 
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Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008.261 After the 
2008 Mumbai attack in which the terrorists used BlackBerry devices, the 
Indian government sought access to telecommunications providers’ data and 
asked certain telecommunications providers to locate their servers in India to 
facilitate access to data by law enforcement.262 More recently, after the 
revelations of widespread NSA spying, the Internet Service Providers 
Association of India, which represents India’s domestic Internet Service 
Providers, asked the government to require foreign internet companies to offer 
services in that country through local servers, citing concerns for their 
consumers’ privacy.263 France just recently adopted the law on military 
programming permitting certain ministries to see “electronic and digital 
communications” in “real time.”264 While in Vietnam, government officials 
justify Decree 72 as necessary for law enforcement, including the enforcement 
of copyright laws regarding news publications and aiding investigation of 
defamation on social networks.265 
 
enforcement may seek to intercept electronic communications of “computer trespassers,” Section 210 expands 
the type of information that law enforcement may obtain from Internet Service Providers, Section 211 expands 
law enforcement’s surveillance and investigatory power to cable internet services, and Section 216 simplified 
the usage authorization of pen registers and trace devices to require only a single court order in order to use 
these devices on any computer or facility anywhere in the country. For a general discussion of the expanding 
surveillance, see MARCIA S. SMITH ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31289, THE INTERNET AND THE USA 
PATRIOT ACT: POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR ELECTRONIC PRIVACY, SECURITY, COMMERCE, AND 
GOVERNMENT (2002), available at http://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/usapatriot/RL31289.pdf. 
 261 Pub. L. No. 110-261, sec. 101(a)(2), § 702(a), 122 Stat. 2436, 2437–38 (2008) (codified at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1881a (2012)) (empowering the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to authorize 
surveillance targeting foreign persons and organizations abroad). 
 262 Praveen Dalal, Big Brother Must Not Overstep the Limits, TEHELKA.COM (Mar. 3, 2012), 
http://www.tehelka.com/big-brother-must-not-overstep-the-limits/ (“Encryption-based service providers such 
as Research In Motion have been forced to establish servers in India and allow access to messenger services to 
intelligence agencies in plain, unencrypted form. Nokia has also established a server in India to facilitate law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies’ interception demands.”); Noah Shachtman, How Gadgets Helped 
Mumbai Attackers, WIRED (Dec. 1, 2008, 6:39 AM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/12/the-gagdets-
of/. 
 263 Vikas SN, Foreign Internet Companies May Be Asked to Setup Local Servers in India, MEDIANAMA 
(June 10, 2013), http://www.medianama.com/2013/06/223-foreign-internet-companies-may-be-asked-to-setup-
local-servers-in-india/; Thomas K. Thomas, Indian Net Firms Want Google, Facebook to Go “Local,” HINDU 
BUS. LINE (June 8, 2013), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/industry-and-economy/info-tech/indian-net-
firms-want-google-facebook-to-go-local/article4795367.ece. 
 264 Loi 2013-1168 du 18 décembre 2013 relative à la programmation militaire pour les années 2014 à 
2019 et portant diverses dispositions concernant la défense et la sécurité nationale [Law No. 2013-1168 of 
December 18, 2013 on the Military Budget for the Years 2014–2019 and Miscellaneous Provisions for 
Defense and National Security], art. 20, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Dec. 19, 2013, p. 20570 (Fr.).  
 265 Nguyen, supra note 166. 
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After a draft of this paper was made available online, we learned that the 
United States government has, on occasion, exercised its authority to review 
foreign investments into United States telecommunications infrastructure to 
require data localization from some of the telecommunications companies.266 
The obligations seem to have arisen as part of the informal “Team Telecom” 
review of such investments. Team Telecom consists in representatives from the 
Departments of Justice, Defense, and Homeland Security, as well as the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation.267 The inconsistent and varying nature of 
these obligations—sometimes requiring only prior notice for the use of a 
foreign service and other times requiring data storage in the United States—
suggests that the law enforcement needs are exaggerated. There is no reason to 
suspect that a criminal is more likely to use one telecommunications provider 
over another. 
Equally important, it seems unlikely that data localization will prove an 
effective means to ensure that data about their residents is available to law 
enforcement personnel when they want it. Moreover, other alternatives are 
reasonably available to assist law enforcement access to data—alternatives that 
are both less trade restrictive and more speech-friendly than data localization. 
Data localization will not necessarily provide law enforcement better 
access to a criminal’s data trail because localization requirements are 
extremely hard to enforce. They might simply end up driving potential 
wrongdoers abroad to less compliant and more secretive services. Indeed, the 
most law-abiding companies will follow costly data localization rules, while 
others will simply ignore them, comforted by the knowledge that such laws are 
difficult to enforce. Any success with gaining information from these 
companies will likely prove temporary, as, over time, potential scofflaws will 
become aware of the monitoring and turn to services that intentionally skirt the 
law. The services avoiding the law will likely be foreign ones, lacking any 
 
 266 See, e.g., Network Security Agreement between U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
U.S. Dep’t of Def., and Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc. § 2.5 (2011), available at https://info.publicintelligence.net/ 
US-NSAs/US-NSAs-Level3.pdf (requiring that data and communications be stored exclusively in the United 
States); Network Security Agreement between U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., and 
TerreStar Corp. § 2.4 (2009), available at https://info.publicintelligence.net/US-NSAs/US-NSAs-TerreStar.pdf 
(requiring that data and communications be made available in the United States); Network Security Agreement 
between U.S. Dep’t of Def., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, AT&T Corp., British 
Telecomm. PLC, TNV (Neth.) BV, VLT Co. LLC, and Violet License Co. LLC § 2.5.2 (1999), available at 
https://info.publicintelligence.net/US-NSAs/US-NSAs-ATT.pdf (requiring that prior notice be given to the 
U.S. Department of Justice before transfer of information abroad). 
 267 See Spencer E. Ante & Ryan Knutson, U.S. Tightens Grip on Telecom, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324906304579037292831912078. 
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personnel or assets on the ground against which to enforce any sanction. Thus, 
understood dynamically, the data localization requirement will only hamper 
local and law-abiding enterprises, while driving some citizens abroad. 
Law enforcement is, without doubt, a laudable goal, so long as the laws 
themselves do not violate universal human rights. Many governments already 
have authority under their domestic laws to compel a company operating in 
their jurisdictions to share data of their nationals held by that company abroad. 
A recent study of ten countries concluded that the government already had the 
right to access data held extraterritorially in the cloud in every jurisdiction 
examined.268 Although the process varied, “every single country . . . vests 
authority in the government to require a Cloud service provider to disclose 
customer data in certain situations, and in most instances this authority enables 
the government to access data physically stored outside the country’s 
borders.”269 
Even if companies refuse to comply with such orders, or if the local 
subsidiary lacks the authority to compel its foreign counterpart to share 
personal data, governments can resort to information-sharing agreements. For 
example, the Convention on Cybercrime, which has been ratified by forty-four 
countries including the United States, France, and Germany,270 obliges 
Member States to adopt and enforce laws against cybercrimes and to provide 
“mutual assistance” to each other in enforcing cyberoffenses.271 Many states 
have entered into specific Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) with 
foreign nations. These treaties establish a process that protects the rights of 
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individuals yet gives governments access to data held in foreign jurisdictions. 
Currently, the United States has MLATs in force with fifty-six countries.272 
The United States also entered into a Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement 
(MLAA) with China and Taiwan.273 All the countries discussed in the country 
studies above, with the exception of Indonesia, Kazakhstan, and Vietnam, have 
MLAT arrangements in force with the United States. Generally, MLATs 
“specify which types of requested assistance must be provided, and which may 
be refused.”274 Requests for assistance may be refused typically when the 
execution of such request would be prejudicial to the state’s security or public 
interest; the request relates to a political offense; there is an absence of 
reasonable grounds; the request does not conform to the MLAT’s provisions; 
or the request is incompatible with the requested state’s law.275 The 
explanatory notes to the MLAT between the United States and the European 
Union observe that a request for data shall only be denied on data protection 
grounds in “exceptional cases.”276 At the same time, there are procedural 
requirements to help ensure that the information gathering is supporting a 
proper governmental investigation. For example, Article 17 of the U.S.–
Germany MLAT provides that the government requesting assistance must do 
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so in writing and must specify the evidence or information sought, authorities 
involved, applicable criminal law provisions, etc.277 
An effective MLAT process gives governments the ability to gather 
information held on servers across the world. The International Chamber of 
Commerce has recognized the crucial role of MLATs in facilitating the lawful 
interception of cross-border data flow and stressed the need to focus on 
MLATs instead of localization measures.278 Similarly, the European 
Commission has recently stressed that the rebuilding of trust in the U.S.–E.U. 
relationship must focus in part on a commitment to use legal frameworks such 
as the MLATs.279 Mutual cooperation arrangements are far more likely to 
prove effective in the long run to support government information gathering 
efforts than efforts to confine information within national borders. 
E. Freedom 
Information control is central to the survival of authoritarian regimes. Such 
regimes require the suppression of adverse information in order to maintain 
their semblance of authority. This is because “even authoritarian governments 
allege a public mandate to govern and assert that the government is acting in 
the best interests of the people.”280 Information that disturbs the claim of a 
popular mandate and a beneficent government is thus to be eliminated at all 
costs. Opposition newspapers or television is routinely targeted, with licenses 
revoked or printing presses confiscated. The Internet has made this process of 
information control far more difficult by giving many dissidents the ability to 
use services based outside the country to share information. The Internet has 
made it harder, though not impossible, for authoritarian regimes to suppress 
their citizens from both sharing and learning information.281 Data localization 
will erode that liberty-enhancing feature of the Internet. 
The end result of data localization is to bring information increasingly 
under the control of the local authorities, regardless of whether that was 
originally intended. The dangers inherent in this are plain. Take the following 
cases. The official motivation for the Iranian Internet, as set forth by Iran’s 
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head of economic affairs Ali Aghamohammadi, was to create an Internet that is 
“a genuinely halal network, aimed at Muslims on an ethical and moral level,” 
which is also safe from cyberattacks (like Stuxnet) and dangers posed by using 
foreign networks.282 However, human rights activists believe that “based on 
[the country’s] track record, obscenity is just a mask to cover the government’s 
real desire: to stifle dissent and prevent international communication.”283 An 
Iranian journalist agreed, “[t]his is a ploy by the regime,” which will “only 
allow[] [Iranians] to visit permitted websites.”284 More recently, even Iran’s 
Culture Minister Ali Janati acknowledged this underlying motivation: “We 
cannot restrict the advance of [such technology] under the pretext of protecting 
Islamic values.”285 
Well aware of this possibility, Internet companies have sought at times to 
place their servers outside the country in order to avoid the information held 
therein being used to target dissidents. Consider one example: when it began 
offering services in Vietnam, Yahoo! made the decision to use servers outside 
the country, perhaps to avoid becoming complicit in that country’s surveillance 
regime.286 This provides important context for the new Vietnamese decree 
mandating local accessibility of data. While the head of the Ministry of 
Information’s Online Information Section defends Decree 72 as 
“misunderstood” and consistent with “human rights commitments,”287 the 
Committee to Protect Journalists worries that this decree will require “both 
local and foreign companies that provide Internet services . . . to reveal the 
identities of users who violate numerous vague prohibitions against certain 
speech in Vietnamese law.”288 As Phil Robertson of Human Rights Watch 
argues, “This is a law that has been established for selective persecution. This 
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is a law that will be used against certain people who have become a thorn in 
the side of the authorities in Hanoi.”289 
Data localization efforts in liberal societies thus offer cover for more 
pernicious efforts by authoritarian states. When Brazil’s government proposed 
a data localization mandate, a civil society organization focused on cultural 
policies compared the measure to the goals of China and Iran: 
Translated, this reads as follows: “Understand this: storing data in-country is 
the Internet dream of China, Iran, and other totalitarian countries, but it is 
IMPOSSIBLE #MarcoCivil.”290 
Thus, perhaps the most pernicious and long-lasting effect of data 
localization regulations is the template and precedent they offer to continue 
and enlarge such controls. When liberal nations decry efforts to control 
information by authoritarian regimes, the authoritarian states will cite our own 
efforts to bring data within national control. If liberal states can cite security, 
privacy, law enforcement, and social economic reasons to justify data controls, 
so can authoritarian states. Of course, the Snowden revelations of widespread 
U.S. surveillance will themselves justify surveillance efforts by other states. 
For example, Russia has begun to use NSA surveillance to justify increasing 
control over companies such as Facebook and Google.291 Such rules have led 
critics to worry about increasing surveillance powers of the Russian state.292 
Critics caution, “In the future, Russia may even succeed in splintering the web, 
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breaking off from the global Internet a Russian intranet that’s easier for it to 
control.”293 Even though officials describe such rules as being antiterrorist, 
others see a more sinister motive. The editor of Agentura.ru, Andrei Soldatov, 
believes that Zheleznyak’s proposal is motivated by the government’s desire to 
control internal dissent.294 Ivan Begtin, the director of the group Information 
Culture, echoes this, arguing that Zheleznyak’s surveillance power “will be yet 
another tool for controlling the Internet.”295 Begtin warns, “In fact, we are 
moving very fast down the Chinese path.”296 
Finally, creating a poor precedent for more authoritarian countries to 
emulate is not the only impact on liberty of data localization by liberal states. 
Even liberal states have used surveillance to undermine the civil rights of their 
citizens and residents.297 The proposal for a German “Internetz” has drawn 
worries that national routing would require deep packet inspection, raising 
fears of extensive surveillance.298 The newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine 
argues that not only would a state-sanctioned network provide “no help against 
spying,” it would lead to “a centralization of surveillance capabilities” for 
German spy agencies.299 India’s proposed localization measures in 
combination with the various surveillance systems in play—including 
Aadhaar, CMS, National Intelligence Grid (Natgrid), and Netra—have raised 
concerns for human rights, including freedom of expression.300 
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In addition to concerns regarding human rights violations based on 
surveillance and censorship, data localization measures also interfere with the 
freedom of expression—particular the “freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontier[].”301 Preventing 
citizens from using foreign political forums because such use might cause 
personal data to be stored or processed abroad might interfere with an 
individuals’ right to knowledge.302 Armed with the ability to block information 
from going out and to filter the information coming in, data location 
consolidates power in governments by making available an infrastructure for 
surveillance and censorship. 
CONCLUSION 
Governments have the right and also the responsibility to insist on the 
privacy and security of the data of their residents as it crosses borders. They 
have a variety of tools available to achieve these goals, including contract 
clauses that commit companies to high security and privacy standards, audits 
and certifications of foreign suppliers, protections available in the local laws of 
the foreign suppliers, and adherence to international agreements and standards 
on such issues, as well as reputational sanctions.303 Efforts to force data 
localization distract from efforts to create better protections for individuals 
across the world. We must insist on data protection without data protectionism. 
A better, safer Internet for everyone should not require breaking it apart. 
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